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Varieties of Quotation Revisited

Our paper ‘Varieties of Quotation’ (1997b; VQ, for short) had three goals:

(i) To marshall data for the relationships among pure, direct, mixed and indirect quotation (as in (1)–(4) respectively).
   (1) ‘Smooth’ is an adjective in English.
   (2) Alice whispered, ‘smooth’.
   (3) Alice said that Bill Clinton is ‘smooth’.
   (4) Alice said that Bill Clinton is smooth.

(ii) To demonstrate that a wide range of theories of pure and indirect quotation fail to explain this data.

(iii) To present a theory that can.

Many authors responded to VQ and we published extensive replies to some (Cappelen and Lepore 1998a, 1998b, 1999a, 1999b). Though we find discussion and debate about mixed quotes (MQ, for short) exhilarating, as with all good things, we eventually got worn out and turned our attention elsewhere, in particular, to writing *Insensitive Semantics* (2005a), where we present a general theory about the nature of semantic context sensitivity and the relationship between semantic and non-semantic content.

The present chapter affords us an opportunity to apply parts of that general theory to a particularly interesting case involving MQ. This is one point (perhaps the only) on which we agree with one of our critics, namely, Recanati (2001a): MQ provides an excellent testing ground for a general theory of the interface between semantic and non-semantic content.

During our period of mixed-quotation obsession, Jerry Fodor suggested to us (in conversation) that the only topic of less philosophical significance than MQ is the semantics of the semi-colon. In response, we drew his attention to the wide range of profound issues related to a correct analysis of sentences like (3). Two larger issues, in particular, create (at least for us) the persistent allure of mixed quotes:

**Opacity:** No theory of opacity is adequate unless it accounts for indirect reports such as those found in (4). No theory of opacity can account for (4) without an account of (3) (since (3), in part, is also an indirect report). This is one of the cen-

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1 We are grateful to Yitzhak Benbaji, Dan Blair, Philippe De Brabanter, John Hawthorne, Francois Recanati, Marga Reimer, and especially Sam Cumming for helpful comments and discussions.
tral claims in VQ. We showed that a wide range of contemporary theories of indirect speech should be rejected simply because they fail to generalize to (3).

The Semantic Content vs. Non-Semantic Content Distinction: MQ provides a test case for how to draw the distinction between semantic content and speech-act content (what some call the semantic-pragmatic distinction).

The present discussion is primarily concerned with the second set of issues. A productive discussion of how to draw the distinction between semantic and non-semantic content is possible only on some sort of neutral ground; data that the various theories can acknowledge and a debate about how best to classify them. Our claim below is that there is such data in connection with MQ and that it provides a decisive case for a semantic (and not a pragmatic) treatment of MQ.

Much to our surprise, a great deal of the criticism of VQ focuses on (i). In particular, several papers argue that we got the data wrong. The goal of the present chapter is to respond to that criticism. Our focus, therefore, will be exclusively on (i); we will have nothing to say about (ii) and (iii). We will return to the basics, the data, to establish what we take to be the foundation for any constructive discussion of these issues.

Our goal is to advance our previous discussions by:

- Rendering more explicit our arguments for a semantic treatment of MQ (in response to Recanati’s charge that our treatment is without argument’ (Recanati, 2001a, 660)).
- Taking a stand on scare quotes, mimicry, mocking language, and the like. We locate these phenomena within the framework of the view articulated and defended in Insensitive Semantics. These all classify as what we shall call Speech-Act Heuristics.
- Responding to two objections to our semantic account—the Cancelability Objection (in two versions), and Recanati’s ‘Convolutedness and Gratuitousness’ Objection.

The chapter divides into five sections. In §1, we characterize generally the difference between semantic and non-semantic accounts of MQ. In §2 we present our version of a semantic account for MQ; in §3 we present Recanati’s version of a non-semantic account for MQ; in §4 we present four arguments for our view over Recanati’s; finally, in §5 we respond to various objections against our account.

1. Overview: Semantic vs. Non-Semantic Accounts of Mixed-Quotation

By ‘a semantic account of MQ’ we mean any theory that accepts (a)–(c):

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2 We no longer endorse all of the details of the view presented in VQ. When ready, we plan to present a revised theory. See Cappelen and Lepore (2007a).
a) The semantic truth conditions for (3) require that Alice used the word ‘smooth’ (in proposition talk: the proposition semantically expressed by an utterance of (3) can’t be true unless Alice used the word ‘smooth’).

b) The semantic truth conditions for (3) require that Alice used the word ‘smooth’ because (3) contains ‘“smooth”’, i.e., it is a part of the semantic truth conditions for (3) that arise as a result of its compositional structure, in particular, as a result of the presence, and position, of ‘“smooth”’ in (3).

c) As a corollary to (b), the requirement specified in (a) arises independently of both the intentions a speaker might happen to have in uttering (3) and also independently of the context she happens to be in when she makes her utterance.

By a ‘pragmatic account of MQ’ we mean any theory that denies one or more of (a)–(c). Versions of the pragmatic account have been presented by, among others, Recanati (2001a) (who bases much of his work on Clark and Gerrig, 1990), Saka (2003), Stainton (1999), and are discussed (though not fully endorsed) by Reimer (2005).

Both semantic and non-semantic accounts can be developed in various ways. In the next two sections we present our version of a semantic account and elaborate on the version of the non-semantic account we intend as our target (though, if we are right, our criticisms extend to all non-semantic accounts of MQ).

2. Our Version of the Semantic Account

As already noted, we developed our views in earlier papers and do not intend to defend all of them again here. Still, we do want to defend a view about pure, direct, and mixed quotation that can be summarized as follows:

Pure Quotes: The semantic function of pure quotes is to refer to expressions. (1) contains an expression, i.e., ‘smooth’, and its semantic function is to refer to ‘smooth’.

(1) ‘Smooth’ is an adjective in English.

By ‘semantic function’ we mean, in part, a function the expression has simply in virtue of its meaning in English. In particular, it has this function independently of any intentions a speaker of (1) might have or of the context in which it is uttered.

Direct Quotation: Quotes as they occur in direct quotes semantically function exactly as in pure quotation, i.e., the semantic function of ‘smooth’ as it occurs in (2) is to refer to ‘smooth’.

(2) Alice whispered ‘smooth’.

Mixed Quotation: Quotes as they occur in MQ function semantically exactly as they do in pure and direct quotes, i.e., the semantic function of ‘“smooth”’, as it occurs in (3) is to refer to ‘smooth’.

3 We say more about what we mean by ‘semantic truth conditions’ below.
(3) Alice said Bill Clinton is 'smooth'.

There are two important expressions in these characterizations: 'refer' and 'expression'. We are using both loosely.

2.1 Reference

By 'refer' we do not mean to indicate anything about the mechanism by which the expression manages to pick out (or to be about) an expression. We certainly do not mean to use it in the sense in which only names (and maybe a few other expressions) can refer (though that is a perfectly reasonable view). In VQ, we defended a specific view of these issues, but the issues at stake here are independent of accepting that particular view.4

2.2 Expression

We also do not take a stand on the nature of expressions. We leave open exactly what an expression is. There is much room for debate here. We have contributed to that debate in VQ, but, to repeat, the arguments in this chapter do not depend on that particular view.

In earlier work, we said very little about mechanisms such as scare quotes, mocking, imitation, echoing, etc. These are issues we thought obviously irrelevant to semantic concerns, and since we thought we were involved in the semantics business, we ignored them. The objections that concern us in this chapter, however, claim that MQ belongs with scare quotes, imitation, echoing, distancing, ridicule, etc. We adamantly disagree, and in order to press our response we must say a bit about how we understand such practices as scare quoting and mockery. Our view, in short, is that these practices are Speech-Act Heuristics. To present our theory of speech-act heuristics, we need to say a bit about how we view the relationship between semantic and speech-act contents.

2.3 Semantic content and speech-act content

On the view we develop in Insensitive Semantics, every utterance expresses an indefinite number of propositions. These are all said, asserted, claimed, suggested, implicated, etc. by the very act of uttering the sentence.5 Taken together, they constitute what we might call the total speech-act content of the utterance. One of the proposi-

4 Our view of this has developed. See Cappelen and Lepore, 2007a.

5 So, in this framework, the fundamental distinction is not Grice's between what's said and what's implicated/suggested (these are all part of the speech-act content), but rather between the semantic content and all other speech-act content. We should also mention that all propositions that are part of the total speech-act content have truth conditions. So, on our view it makes no sense to speak of the truth conditions of an utterance. Many propositions get expressed; each has truth conditions, but only one is the proposition semantically expressed.
tions said, asserted, claimed, etc. by an utterance \( u \) of a sentence \( S \) is the proposition that \( S \) semantically expresses. It is the proposition expressed by \( S \) by virtue of the meanings of its words and their compositional structure. This proposition is distinguished from (most of) the other propositions expressed by \( u \) inasmuch as it is expressed by every utterance of \( S \). (Those interested in the further development and defence of this view should read *Insensitive Semantics.*)

2.4 *Speech-act heuristics*

On to what we call Speech-Act Heuristics: these are various non-semantic features of an utterance \( u \) of a sentence \( S \) that function either as (a) or (b):

a) They contribute to the speech-act content of \( u \), i.e., they make it the case that certain propositions are said, asserted, claimed, implicated, suggested, etc., by \( u \).

b) They help render certain parts of the speech-act content contextually salient.

2.4.1 Example of (A)

*An ironic tone of voice*: an ironic utterance of ‘\( X \) was really good’ can be used to say that \( X \) wasn’t really good, even though the semantic content of this sentence is that \( X \) was really good.

*Wink/wink*: the same effect can be achieved by winking an eye—the wink-wink effect. Think, for example, of a waiter who’s prohibited from making disparaging remarks about the food he serves, but who, with his back to the manager, says (in a non-ironic tone), ‘That’s really good’, accompanied by a contextually appropriate facial expression. That can successfully convey to his audience that the said food is not really very good; it’s indeed bad.

*Threatening demeanour*: as evidenced by innumerable mafia movies and Sopranos episodes: a sinister tone of voice, the speaker’s strangling hands around the addressee’s neck, and a menacing facial expression, combined with an utterance of ‘Where’s my money?’, can convey to the addressee that something bad will happen to the addressee unless he presents the speaker with the contextually salient amount of money.

2.4.2 Example of (B)

Background music can stress certain interpretations over others, i.e., it can make certain components of the speech-act content particularly salient. Commercials and movies rely on these devices all the time. Consider how the music score of silent films coupled with the dialogue placards worked together to indicate whether various ‘utterances’ were incantations of love or expressions of threat or fear. These music scores temper everything the villain or hero says with menace or romance. Count Dracula needn’t utter anything more than ‘Good evening’ but in the right context, surrounded by the right musical inflection his words might easily convey something menacing.
This is surely not part of the semantic content of his greeting but, just the same, it is distinctly part of the speech act he performs.

Mimicry, mockery, and scare quoting are also speech-act heuristics.

*Imitation and mockery*: people use strange accents to imitate real or imagined utterances. Sometimes this is done to mock a contextually salient character. Mocking is a way to express some kind of derogatory attitude towards another. Tone is responsible for that attitude being expressed. That it is expressed is part of the speech-act content of the utterance. Clearly, it is not part of its semantic content, but just the same it gets expressed through the heuristic of tone of voice.

*Scare quotes*: scare quotes are a central and pervasive device for effecting distance. They enable speakers to indicate that they distance themselves, for whatever reason or in whatever way, from certain aspects of certain linguistic practices. In this respect, they are a speech-act heuristic. What exactly this sort of distancing consists of is an interesting question, and we won’t try to answer it here (but see Cappelen and Lepore, 2007a). Whatever one ends up saying about this distancing effect, what is of significance in the current context is that distancing is a component of the speech-act content of the utterance, but not its semantic content.

In sum, our view of scare quoting goes like this: it is a speech-act heuristic, and as such it contributes to speech-act content, but it does not contribute to the proposition semantically expressed. It is, in effect, no more a linguistic constituent of the sentence than a gesture or a winking eye.⁶

2.5 *Dual purpose vs. ambiguity: quotation marks*

Many careful speakers do not use the same symbol for quotation marks and scare quotes. American English typically uses single quotes for scare quotes (or italicization) and double quotes for genuine quotation marks. However, not all speakers are equally cautious. There are respectable writers, publishers, newspapers, etc. that employ the same orthographic symbol for both purposes. In this regard, at least for these scare-quotes practitioners, quote marks carry two distinct purposes: one semantic, the other a pragmatic contribution to speech-act content. Their semantic function is to refer to expressions, but they can also be used as a speech-act heuristic.

Although they have these dual functions or purposes, we strongly resist calling quotation marks ambiguous, since we would like to reserve the term ‘ambiguous’ for expressions with more than one semantic function.⁷

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⁶ This is also what we are inclined to say about Reimer’s example of font size used to indicate volume of voice. She imagines a written language in which ‘font size is regularly used to indicate the volume of an agent whose speech is being reported. Large font is used to indicate high volume, regular font to indicate normal volume, and small font to indicate low volume’ (Reimer, 2005). The size of the font is, on the view we endorse, a speech-act heuristic, and as such not, strictly speaking, a constituent of the sentence.

⁷ Note that nothing we have said so far prohibits quotation marks from being used on a given occasion with both purposes. When we write that Vice President Dick Cheney told Senator Patrick Lahey to go ‘fuck’ himself we might be simultaneously mix-quoting Cheney and distancing ourselves from, i.e., scare-quoting, the vice president’s use of the F-word.
2.6 Summary of our version of the semantic account

2.6.1 The Referentiality of Pure, Direct, and Mixed Quotation

The semantic function of 'smooth' in (1), (2), and (3) is to refer to an expression. This is a permanent feature of every single utterance of these sentences.

2.6.2 Scare Quotes, Etc.

Consider an utterance $u$ of (5), in which 'the one' is used as a scare quote:

(5) Mary is 'the one'.

(5) expresses the same proposition as (5'):

(5') Mary is the one.

Every utterance of both (5) and (5') expresses the proposition that Mary is the one. Still, on the assumption that a given token of (5) is uttered with the relevant intentions, then that utterance has as its speech-act content the second-order proposition that the speaker of $u$ distances herself (in some contextually salient way) from the use of the expression 'the one'. That this is a matter of speech-act heuristics and not a matter of semantic content we will defend below.

3. Recanati’s Version of the Non-Semantic Account

We will focus on one way of presenting Recanati’s version of the non-semantic account, namely: MQ is ‘the tip of an iceberg’ and this is an iceberg made out of non-semantic phenomena. MQ is the same sort of device as those used in exaggerated tones of voice, scare quotes, and mimicry. These are all non-semantic phenomena, and hence, MQ is as well. Recanati writes: ‘Following Clark, I hold that quotations are linguistic demonstrations. What the ‘quotation marks’ conventionally indicate in writing is the fact that the enclosed material is displayed for demonstrative purposes rather than used in the normal way. But neither the displayed material nor the target of the demonstration (whether distal or proximal) is referred to’ (Recanati, 2001a, 649). It is important to note that Recanati does not use ‘demonstration’ in the sense of ‘to demonstrate an object, using a demonstrative pronoun’. He, rather, uses it in the sense of ‘to illustrate’ or ‘to exemplify’, the sense in which you can demonstrate (illustrate, exemplify) how someone uttered a sentence. Quoting Clark, Recanati writes:

> The properties of the displayed token which the quoter calls attention to need not be purely linguistic properties—the sort of properties which are constitutive of linguistic types (word-types and sentence-types). As Clark points out, we do not merely demonstrate the words, but we also ‘depict all manner of speech characteristics—speed, gender, age, dialect, accent, drunkenness, lisping, anger, surprise, fear, stupidity, hesitancy, power’. (Clark, 1996, 175; Recanati, 2001a, 641)

Since the way in which we use language to mimic, demonstrate, or illustrate speed, drunkenness, surprise, etc. is not something semantics should explain, and since
mixed quotation is alleged to group with those phenomena, it follows that mixed quotation requires a non-semantic explanation.

In line with this view, Recanati says about such alleged demonstrative uses of language: ‘Mixed Quotation is only a particular case of that phenomenon. The speaker uses certain words in expressing the content of the attitude or speech act he or she is reporting, while at the same time drawing the hearer’s attention to them for demonstrative purposes’ (Recanati, 2001a, 660).

He then draws the conclusion that the view we defend in VQ is mistaken:

In this framework, it is simply not true that the proposition expressed by the complement sentence in (1) [Quine says that quotation 'has a certain anomalous feature'] is 'about words', as Cappelen and Lepore claim (without argument)… On the present proposal, however, the proposition expressed by the complement sentence is the same with or without the quotation marks, and it is not about words. (Recanati, 2001a, 660)

Stainton endorses a closely related view:

A speaker could report parts of Alice’s conversation in a squeaky voice, or with a French accent, or with a stutter, or using great volume. In none of these cases would the speech reporter say, assert, or state that Alice spoke in these various ways… In these cases, the truth conditions of the speech report are exhausted by the meaning of the words, and how the words are put together; as far as truth conditions are concerned, the tone, volume, accent etc. add nothing whatever. Ditto, say I, for the quotation marks in mixed quotation. In which case, [6] isn’t false where Alice actually speaks the words ‘is tough to understand’. It may, of course, be illicitious and misleading. (Stainton, 1999, 273–4, italics added; similar quotes can be found in Clark and Gerrig, 1990)

Recanati concludes:

Consider example (1) [Quine says that quotation 'has an anomalous feature']. Knowing the conventional meaning of quotation marks, the hearer can retrieve the conventional implicature that the speaker (Davidson) uses the words 'has an anomalous feature' demonstratively. Fleshing out the implicature he identifies the distal target (Quine’s utterance, which Davidson is reporting) and sorts out the depictive and other properties of the signal. Finally he makes sense of the demonstration by recognizing Davidson’s intention to let him know that Quine used those very words. The last mentioned aspect of the interpretation is clearly pragmatic… It is a matter of identifying the point of the demonstration. If this is right, then the ascription of the quoted words to the person whose speech or thought is reported is not even a conventional implicature. It belongs to the most pragmatic layer of interpretation, where one tries to make sense of the speaker’s act of demonstration in the broader context in which it takes place. This is not ‘interpretation’ in the narrowly linguistic sense. (Recanati, 2001a, 667)

### 3.1 Recanati’s view of pure and direct quotation

As we understand Recanati, he agrees with what we say about ‘‘smooth’’ as it occurs in (1) and (2). These occurrences of quotes he labels closed and closed quotes are singular
terms used to refer to expressions. Since we emphasize the uniformity between (3) and (1)–(2), it’s important to say something about Recanati’s account of “smooth” as it occurs in (1).

Whenever a linguistic demonstration (a quotation) is linguistically recruited in this way and serves as a singular term, filling a slot in the sentence, I say the quotation is closed. (Recanati, 2001a, 649)

Quotations can also, and often do, contribute directly to truth-conditional content. That happens whenever a quotation is closed, that is, linguistically recruited as a singular term in the mentioning sentence. Because it functions as a regular singular term, both syntactically and semantically, closed quotation undoubtedly is a genuine linguistic phenomenon (Recanati, 2001a, 683)

We have no idea what, exactly, it means to say that a quotation (or a demonstration) is ‘recruited’ to be a singular term and, as far as we can tell, that question is never answered in his paper, but that aside, we take this last passage to mean Recanati agrees with our account of pure and direct quotation.8

3.2 Summary of Recanati’s view

We summarize his view in two central claims:

• The Referentiality of Pure and Direct Quotation

The function of ‘smooth’ in (1) and (2) is to refer to an expression. In our terminology (translated from Recanati’s) the semantic function of ‘smooth’ in these sentences, i.e., in sentences in which the quotation is ‘recruited’, is to be a singular term.

• The Non-Referentiality of Mixed Quotation

‘Smooth’ as it occurs in (3), however, has no semantic function to refer to ‘smooth’: ‘the ascription of the quoted words to the person whose speech or thought is reported…belongs to the most pragmatic layer of interpretation, where one tries to make sense of the speaker’s act of demonstration in the broader context in which it takes place’ (Recanati, 2001a, 667). We end our discussion of Recanati’s view with one very important qualification: our presentation is accurate only if one ignores what Recanati says about the behaviour of indexicals in MQ (Recanati, 2001a, 674–80). Recanati’s view undergoes what we perceive as a radical (and unmotivated) transformation once he discusses what he calls ‘non-cumulative hybrids’. That’s not how he sees it. We pursue this issue in our discussion of Argument 1 in the next section.

8 We should note that there’s room for disagreement over the correct interpretation of the quoted passage from Recanati (2001a, 683). The only way we can make sense of it is as endorsing a semantic account of pure quotation. Benbaji has suggested to us alternative interpretations, but pursuing that issue will take us too far from our main argumentative path.
4. Arguments in Favour of the Semantic (and against the Non-Semantic) Account of Mixed Quotation

According to Recanati, we (i.e., Cappelen and Lepore) claim ‘without argument’ (Recanati, 2001a, 660) that the complement clause in (3) is ‘about words’. We have to admit that when we wrote our 1997b paper, we took the semantic account to be obviously true. So, Recanati’s challenge is fair. Here, then, are four separate arguments in favour of a semantic account of MQ.

4.1 Argument 1: argument from behaviour of indexicals in mixed quotes

The behaviour of indexicals in MQ pretty much establishes that any non-semantic account of MQ fails. Here is an example of a journalist’s MQ from our 1997b paper ‘Varieties of Quotation’:

Mr. Greenspan said he agreed with Labor Secretary R. B. Reich ‘on quite a lot of things’. Their accord on this issue, he said, has proved ‘quite a surprise to both of us’ (Cappelen and Lepore, 1997b, 429).

Notice the occurrence of ‘us’ in the last sentence of this passage. It refers to Greenspan and Reich and not to the journalist and someone else. If the quotation marks in this sentence were semantically superfluous (as they are according to non-semanticists such as Recanati and Stainton), then this occurrence of ‘us’ should be read as spoken by the journalist (i.e., the reporter).

Two examples from Cumming (2005) make this point even clearer:

(C1) Bush also said his administration would ‘achieve our objectives’ in Iraq.
(C2) He now plans to make a new, more powerful absinthe that he says will have ‘a more elegant, refined taste than the one I’m making now’. (New York Times, 4 November 2004)

Remember, according to Recanati, ‘the proposition expressed by the complement sentence is the same with or without the quotation marks’ (2001a, 660). According to Stainton, ‘as far as truth conditions are concerned, the [quotation marks in mixed quotation] add nothing whatever.’ Try removing them; what results are (C1*) and (C2*):

(C1*) Bush also said his administration would achieve our objectives in Iraq.
(C2*) He now plans to make a new, more powerful absinthe that he says will have a more elegant, refined taste than the one I’m making now.

These are obviously mistaken renderings of (C1) and (C2). As we see it, this is extremely strong evidence that quotation marks in mixed quotes have semantic significance. Recanati disagrees. In what follows, we present and evaluate his response.

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9 This observation has been emphasized to us by Cumming (2005). Although he uses it to defend an account other than our own, he brought us to see clearly the significance of this data.

10 Saka (2003) claims that a MQ is ‘assertorically equivalent’ to the indirect report that results from removing the quotation marks. Again, the behaviour of indexicals shows his view to be deeply flawed.
Recanati’s Account of Indexicals in MQ

Recanati, much to his credit, discusses the data we have presented, but fails to recognize their devastating implications for his own view. His response (see his 2001a, 674–80) is twofold. He agrees that in such cases there is a semantic effect (on what he calls c-content), i.e., the quotation marks influence semantic content. He does not, however, agree they have a direct semantic effect. He thinks the effect is only indirect via a pre-semantic effect. What does he mean? Here’s Recanati’s view in summary (what follows paraphrases pp. 674–80 in Recanati, 2001a):

The notion of a pre-semantic process is taken from Kaplan (1989a, 559). Kaplan writes: ‘Given an utterance, semantics cannot tell us what expression was uttered or what language it was uttered in. This is a pre-semantic task.’ Another example of a ‘pre-semantic task’ is disambiguation. If a word has two meanings, semantics won’t tell you which meaning is intended in a particular utterance. Of course, pre-semantic processes have an effect on semantic content, but only an ‘indirect’ one. About language selection, Recanati writes, ‘the process of semantic composition which outputs the c-content [what we call ‘semantic content’] takes the meaning of the constituent words as input, and the meaning of the constituent words itself depends upon the language(s) to which the words in question are taken to belong’ (p. 676). In other words, even though language selection influences the c-content of the utterance, it does so only indirectly through the determination of the input to the semantic machinery that churns out c-content: ‘That process of input-determination is, by definition, pre-semantic’ (p. 676). Sense selection (i.e., the choice we must make when faced with ambiguity) has the same kind of pre-semantic, hence ‘indirect’, effect on semantic content. In sum: language and sense selection are paradigmatic pre-semantic processes.

What does any of this have to do with interpreting indexicals in MQ? Well, faced with the examples we have presented (he discusses our Greenspan quote), Recanati grants that quotation marks have an effect on c-content (semantic content), but not directly. They only affect pre-semantic processes and they have an indirect effect on c-content. In this respect they are exactly like language and sense selection. The quotation marks (in effect, the accompanying demonstration\(^{11}\)) tell us which context we should consider those words as uttered in. The quotation marks (and the accompanying demonstration) tell us that the quoted words should be interpreted as uttered by the reportee (the person being reported), and not the context of the reporter (the person uttering the indirect report). In (C1), the quotation serves the pre-semantic function of telling us that the quoted words should be interpreted as uttered by Bush, and not by whoever utters (C1):

(C1) Bush also said his administration would ‘achieve our objectives’ in Iraq.

In sum: Recanati’s response to the claim that indexicals in MQ have semantic impact is to agree, but to insist that the effect is pre-semantic, and hence, indirect. It is not properly semantic.

\(^{11}\) Since quotation marks for Recanati are nothing but an indicator of the speaker’s demonstrative intentions.
4.1.2 Response to Recanati's Account of Indexicals in MQ

Recanati's response is an elaborate version of what, in technical terminology, is called a snow-job. In effect, Recanati recognizes that the quotation marks in MQ have a semantic effect, and he tries to save his non-semantic account by calling this effect ‘pre-semantic’—but labels don't change the facts, and the facts are these:

\[ F1: \] The behaviour of indexicals proves that the quotation marks in MQ determine semantic content (what Recanati calls c-content).

\[ F2: \] If you remove the quotation marks, you change the semantic content. You get a proposition that is not, at any level of analysis, expressed by any utterance of, for example, (C1) and (C2). In other words, Recanati's claim that ‘the proposition expressed by the complement sentence is the same with or without the quotation marks’ (2001a, 660) is just not true.

\[ F3: \] The semantic effect of the quotation marks is not determined by speaker intentions (demonstrative or otherwise). A speaker can have whatever intentions she wants, but these do not change the fact that indexicals inside MQ must be read as spoken by the reportee (i.e., the person the report is attributed to), and not the reporter (the person uttering the sentence with MQ). In other words, Recanati's claim that quotation 'belongs to the most pragmatic layer of interpretation, where one tries to make sense of the speaker's act of demonstration in the broader context in which it takes place' (p. 667) is just not true.

It doesn't matter what we call this effect—semantic, schmemantic, or pre-semantic. Who cares? The truth of F1–F3 suffices to undermine any non-semantic account of MQ.

Putting aside the question of labelling, the analogy with language and sense selection is also no good. Here are some important differences:

\[ D1: \] In MQ, there are syntactic entities in the sentence—the quotation marks—that determine the semantic value of lexical items (the indexicals inside the quotation marks). One can formulate rules for how these syntactic entities determine semantic content. That's exactly not what goes on when we choose language or disambiguate: no syntactic entity in the sentence dictates one language/sense over another. That effect results only from speaker intentions.

\[ D2: \] The syntactic entity (i.e., the quotation marks) interacts systematically with other components of the sentence; it is, for example, sensitive to scope. To see this consider an iterated indirect report containing MQ:

(IR) Tom: Bill said that Tim said that Sally ‘crashed my brother’s car’.

Notice that you have to read the indexicals inside the quotation marks as spoken by Tim and not by Bill or Tom.\(^{12}\) This reading is dictated by the meaning and structure of

\(^{12}\) Cumming tells us that some informants manage to get two readings, depending on scope: either the quoted material is interpreted relative to Bill's context or relative to Tim's. What's ruled out is a reading where they are interpreted relative to Tom's context.
the sentence. What more is required to make this phenomenon semantic? Again, choose to call it ‘pre-semantic’. That won’t change the facts.

D3: In the case of language selection, speaker intentions have the final word. Take an utterance of ‘MIA LOVES FRED’. If we tell you it was uttered as an English sentence, it means one thing (viz. that Mia loves Fred). If we tell you it was uttered as a Norwegian sentence, it means something else (viz. that Mia is being promised peace). We (i.e., Cappelen and Lepore) choose which language the utterance is in. It is, however, not up to Tom how the indexicals inside the quotation marks in (IR) are to be interpreted. He cannot, for example, choose to have them interpreted relative to his own context. He cannot because the semantics of the sentence dictates the correct reading.

4.1.3 Concluding Remarks About Indexicals in Mixed Quotation

The behaviour of indexicals provides compelling evidence in favour of a semantic account of MQ. That observation, however, raises a challenge: how can a semantic theory explain these data? We will not attempt to provide an answer here. Our goal is just to establish that a semantic account is needed. Suffice it to say that we still think a dual paratactic account (a paratactic account both of quotation and of indirect speech along the lines of our 1997b paper) succeeds.

A final word about monsters: Kaplan (1989) defines a monstrous operator as one that shifts the context of evaluation of an indexical away from the context of the actual speech act. He claims that monsters not only do not exist, but that they could not exist in a natural language. The data above make it extremely tempting to understand MQ as monsters. (For monstrous interpretations, see for example Cumming, 2005, and Geurts and Maier, 2005.) We think this temptation should be resisted, and the account in Cappelen and Lepore (2007a) does not introduce monsters.

4.2 Argument 2: Argument from Inferential Connection

Imagine that someone held the strange view expressed in (6):

(6) ‘Smooth’ is an indecent word.

This person could conclude from (6) and (2), or from (6) and (3), that Alice used an indecent word. Or, consider an organization, e.g., the FCC (a regulatory organization for US radio and TV), which holds it illegal to use the word ‘motherfucker’ on public airwaves. If Howard Stern utters ‘George W. Bush is a motherfucker’ on his radio programme, we can report him as follows:

(7) Howard Stern said on his radio programme that the 43rd president of the US is a ‘motherfucker’.

Suppose also that (8) is true.

(8) It is illegal to use the word ‘motherfucker’ over public airwaves.
From (7) and (8) it follows that Stern has done something illegal, i.e., he has used the word ‘motherfucker’ over public airwaves.

The semantic account can explain these inferential connections: these inferences are valid because ‘motherfucker’ has the same semantic value in (7) and (8) and ‘smooth’ has the same semantic value in (3) and (6).

The non-semantic account, however, can’t explain these inferences. According to the non-semantic account, ‘smooth’ in (3) does not refer to ‘smooth’ and (7) does not make reference to ‘motherfucker’. Semantically, there’s no such reference in (3) or (7) and so, the semantic content for (6) conjoined with (3) does not imply Alice used an indecent word (and the semantic content for (7) conjoined with (8) does not entail Howard Stern used an indecent word).

4.3 Argument 3: argument from non-cancelability

Step 1: If a component of the content expressed by a sentence $S$ is not cancelable, then we have good reason to think that this feature is part of the semantic content of $S$.

Step 2: The reference to ‘smooth’ is not cancelable in (3). This can be shown using both of Grice’s cancelability tests. Grice distinguishes between explicit and contextual cancelability; he writes:

*a putative conversational implicature that $p$ is explicitly cancelable if, to the form of words the utterance of which putatively implicates that $p$, it is admissible to add but not $p$, or I do not mean to imply that $p$, and it is contextually cancelable if one can find situations in which the utterance of the form of words would simply not carry the implicature* (Grice, 1989, 44).

That the reference to ‘smooth’ is not explicitly cancelable is evidenced by there being no true utterance of (9):

(9) Alice said that Bill Clinton is ‘smooth’, but she never used ‘smooth’.

That the reference to ‘smooth’ is not contextually cancelable is evidenced by the fact that there are no utterances of (3) in which ‘smooth’ does not refer to ‘smooth’.

Conclusion: We have good reason to believe the reference to ‘smooth’ is part of the semantic content of (3). Several suggestions have been made to the effect that the reference to ‘smooth’ in (3) can be cancelled. We discuss these in §5 below.

4.4 Argument 4: argument from collective indirect reports

Take 7,894 utterances of some sentence $S$ in widely varying contexts, i.e., let speakers’ intentions and whatever happens to be contextually salient vary in every which way among these utterances. If it is true to report all of these 7,894 utterances by the report ‘Each speaker said that $p$’, it is reasonable to assume that all of these utterances semantically (and compositionally) express the proposition that $p$. It is reasonable because, by assumption, all the relevant non-semantic features vary among these 7,894 utterances. It follows that no particular set of such features can explain how each speaker ended up
saying that p. What can explain this fact are the semantic properties of S, i.e., those properties that all these utterances share simply by virtue of being utterances of the sentence S.

Applied to MQ: consider 7,894 utterances of the English sentence (3) in varied contexts (i.e., let the speakers and their intentions and what's contextually salient vary in every imaginable way). It is, we claim, acceptable and accurate to collectively report these sundry utterances all as follows:

(10) They all said that Alice said that Bill Clinton is 'smooth'.

The non-semantic account cannot explain the truth of (10). If the non-semantic account were correct, then the contribution of 'smooth' to what was communicated would depend on speakers' intentions, and/or the context a speaker happens to be in. These, we have assumed, vary widely, and so there should be no way to make (10) come out true.

5. Objections to the Semantic Account and Arguments in Favour of the Non-Semantic Account

We now discuss two objections raised against the semantic account, in the face of arguments in its defence: the Cancelability Objection and Recanati’s objection that our account is ‘convoluted and gratuitous’. We’ll begin by presenting and replying to two versions of the Cancelability Objection.

5.1 The cancelability objection

One objection we have encountered frequently is that our cancelability argument is unsound: the second premise in that argument is alleged to be false, i.e., the premise that the reference to ‘“smooth”’ is cancelable in (3). We have encountered two versions of this objection, differing with respect to the way in which the reference to ‘smooth’ in (3) is alleged to be cancelable.

5.1.1 Version 1 of the cancelability objection: Cancellation through Imitation/Mimicry/Scare Quoting

Consider an utterance of (11):

(11) Alice said that ‘speech-act pluralists’ are handsome,

where we’ll assume that the speaker is using the expression ‘speech-act pluralists’ as scare-quoted, i.e., where she wants to distance herself from the usage of ‘speech-act pluralist’, perhaps because she thinks there’s something fishy about the terminology.

Note: if S contains a genuinely context-sensitive term, keep its semantic value stable or just let the relevant contextual feature vary except in that respect. For an elaboration, see chapter 7 of Insensitive Semantics.

This objection has been raised in Recanati (2000, 2001b), and in conversation with him about his paper, and is discussed extensively in Reimer’s contribution to this volume.
She is not intending to say Alice used the expression ‘speech-act pluralist’. (Alice might, for example, have mentioned particular speech-act pluralists by name, and said about them that they are handsome.)

Or, consider an utterance of (3) in which the quotation marks are used to indicate that the speaker is mocking one of the audience’s preferred pieces of terminology. Maybe one of the addressees (or some other contextually salient character) likes to use the word ‘smooth’ and pronounces it in a peculiar fashion. The quotation marks, then, could be used to indicate this, and not to indicate that Alice used the word ‘smooth’.

In both cases, there’s no contradiction in adding, ‘but Alice didn’t use the word “smooth”.’ So, our opponent concludes, the reference to ‘smooth’ in (3) and the expression ‘speech-act pluralists’ in (11) are cancelable.

5.1.1.1 Reply to First Version of the Cancelability Objection Our response is twofold. The first fold has to do with a fundamental feature of all cancelability tests: the fact that there are many individuals named ‘Alice’ doesn’t show that reference to Alice is cancelable in an utterance of (12). Suppose that there is a true utterance of (13) (i.e., where two different Alices are referenced), that doesn’t show that reference to ‘Alice’ in (12) is cancelable, and hence, not semantic.

(12) Alice went to Wonderland.
(13) Alice went to Wonderland, but Alice didn’t go to Wonderland.

In other words, for a cancelability test to work, you must fix the referent (and satisfaction conditions) for terms with multiple referents or which are ambiguous, and ensure that these are used in the same way in the various sentences involved throughout the test. We are not claiming quotes are semantically ambiguous, but we are claiming they have a dual usage. They are used sometimes as a semantic device (for referring to expressions) and sometimes as a speech-act heuristic. The point we just made about ambiguity and multiple referents applies to dual usage as well. For the cancelability test to work, you must ensure the expression is used in the same way in both cases.

The examples alleged to show that the reference to ‘smooth’ is cancelable in (3) violate this constraint on cancelability tests. In other words, a misapplication of the test no more establishes the cancelability of reference to ‘smooth’ in (3) than a true utterance of (13) establishes the cancelability of the reference to Alice in (12).

The second part of our response is a reductio and it will move only those who think pure quotes (as they occur in subject position, as in (1)) have the semantic function of referring to expressions: mimicry, imitation, and scare quotes can be used when quotes occur in subject position as well. Consider (14):

(14) ‘Water’ is interesting.

“Water”’ here could of course be used as a scare quote; imagine, for example, a meeting of chemists. Purists as they are, they do not consider anything but pure H2O as water, but they are aware of colloquial usage in which people use ‘water’ to refer to
H2O combined with other chemicals. Imagine they are looking at a glass of tap water reacting in an interesting way with another chemical. An utterance of (14) in this context would be an instance of a scare-quoted use of ‘water’. But these circumstances also render an utterance of (15) perfectly natural (assume, for example, that these chemists do not find the semantics of mass terms interesting):

(15) ‘Water’ is interesting, but ‘water’ is not.

Our point is this: if you think that reference to words in MQ is cancelable (hence, not semantic) because of scare-quote uses, then, for the very same reason, you should think that reference to words in pure quotation, as in (14) (when ‘Water’ is not used as a scare quote), is cancelable, and hence, non-semantic. That move would be radical and we doubt many proponents of a non-semantic account of MQ would accept a non-semantic account of pure quotation.

Our view is that (15) provides no evidence in favour of the cancelability of the reference to water in (14). To think otherwise would be to exhibit a misunderstanding of the nature of cancelability tests.

5.1.2 VERSION 2 OF CANCELABILITY OBJECTION: CANCELABILITY THROUGH TRANSLATION

Tsohatzidis (1998) wrote a response to VQ in which he argued that our theory cannot explain what can be called ‘translational mixed-quotes’. His observations can be used to support the Cancelability Objection (that is how Reimer and Saka use it in their contributions to this volume). Suppose Alice is a monolingual Norwegian speaker, and that your audience speaks English, but not Norwegian. You can report Alice with (3), even though she never uttered the English word ‘smooth’; rather she uttered its Norwegian translation.

(16) Alice said that Bill Clinton is ‘smooth’, but she didn’t use the English word ‘smooth’ because she speaks only Norwegian.

Here’s an example from Tsohatzidis (1998):

(T1) In one of the greatest philosophy books ever written in Latin, Descartes said that man ‘is a thinking substance’.

So, our opponent concludes, on the basis of the naturalness of this utterance of (16) and (T1), that the alleged reference to ‘smooth’ is cancelable in (3).

5.1.2.1 Reply to Second Version of Cancelability Objection Our first reaction is this: we don’t really understand how anyone can think of this as an argument for the view that the occurrence of quotation marks in MQ is cancelable. It doesn’t even move in the direction of that conclusion. The data is supposed to be this: the speaker of, e.g., (T1) says something that can be true if Descartes wrote that man is a thinking substance and did it using words translatable into English as ‘is a thinking substance’. That’s of course
just a first stab at a paraphrase (and we in no way intend it as a final theoretic account). But what's important is this: there's no way to explain what is going on in these cases without making reference to 'is a thinking substance'. (T1) says something about the relationship between what Descartes wrote and the words 'is a thinking substance'. Maybe the relationship is literal translation; we won't take a stand on that, but what is clear is that reference to 'is a thinking substance' is ineliminable. So, we don't see how this is even the beginning of an argument for the view that quotation marks in MQ are cancelable.

It might of course be an objection to our 1997b account of how to understand the relationship between Descartes' utterance and 'is a thinking substance' (that was how Tsohatzidis originally used the argument), but that's different from an argument to the effect the quotation marks are pragmatic flourishes without semantic import.

Second, we think it is quite easy to account for the relationship between Descartes and 'is a thinking substance' in (T1). In Cappelen and Lepore (1998b) we suggested (but did not fully endorse) the following reply to Tsohatzidis:

we recommend careful reflection on the same-tokening relation. Just as in the case of same-saying, there should be placed no a priori constraints on what can same-token what. The relation is at least as flexible and context sensitive as same-saying. We see no principled objection to saying that in some contexts same-tokening can rely on translation. (Cappelen and Lepore, 1998b, 665)

On second thought, our response to Tsohatzidis strikes us as excellent and we now fully endorse it. Applied to (16), the implication is this: the appearance of cancelability in (16) is due to the differences between the predicates 'said that' and 'use the English word'. It does not concern the reference to 'smooth' in either (3) or (16). 'Smooth' refers to 'smooth' in all of its occurrences. The appearance of cancelability is due to the fact that it can be true of Alice that she said Bill Clinton is 'smooth' even though she didn't use the English word 'smooth'. This is because it is possible for (3) to be true when Alice's utterance was of a word that translates into the English word 'smooth', i.e., "smooth" in (3) refers to 'smooth', but you can say that Bill Clinton is 'smooth' even though you didn't use the word 'smooth'.

5.2 Recanati's objection: Cappelen and Lepore's account is 'convoluted and gratuitous'

The central topic of VQ is how a semantic theory could deal with the two semantic functions of 'smooth' in (3). It is used both in characterizing what Alice said and in articulating (some) of the words she used in saying it. Speaking loosely, we suggested an utterance of (3) is true just in case Alice said that Bill Clinton was smooth, using the word 'smooth' in saying it. We developed a theory of how to achieve this result, a theory we will not elaborate on here and we instead refer the reader to VQ.15

15 This theory is currently undergoing some revisions, and we plan to present a new account in future work, but the basic insight defended there we still endorse.
About this theory, Recanati writes: '[Cappelen and Lepore's theory] I find convoluted and gratuitous. The form of composition appealed to is, to my knowledge unheard of. The only motivation for offering baroque accounts like this is the desire to preserve a dogma: the view that quotations refer' (Recanati, 2001a, 657). Despite an extended discussion of our view, and continuous comparison between his and our views, this objection and the cancelation objection (presented rather awkwardly, by our lights, in two footnotes) are in effect the only objections to our view he raises.

Even though the goal of this chapter is not to defend the entirety of our positive account in VQ, Recanati’s remark is relevant to the debate between the semantic and non-semantic accounts of MQ because he is (or at least seems to be) saying that the only reason for assuming "smooth" in (3) refers is a desire to preserve a dogma. He also claims that so doing leads to theories that are ‘convoluted and gratuitous’ such as ours. The way to avoid this, he suggests, is to go non-semantic about the reference to ‘smooth’ in (3).

5.2.1 OUR RESPONSE TO RECANATI’S ‘OBJECTION’

First, consider Recanati’s claim that the motivation for our theory ‘is the desire to preserve a dogma: the view that quotations refer’. That’s a somewhat inaccurate description of our motivation. Our starting point was the simple intuition, widely shared, that (3) is true just in case Alice said that Bill Clinton is smooth and said it using the word ‘smooth’. That is, the word ‘smooth’ is, in some way, simultaneously used and mentioned in (3). We presented a theory that would account for this intuition. As for the claim that it is a dogma that quotations refer, we assume Recanati doesn’t reject this alleged dogma out of hand since he himself embraces the view that quotations, e.g., as they occur in (1) and (2), are used to refer. There might be a legitimate debate about whether ‘smooth’ in (3) semantically refers, but that debate should be settled independently of the details of our positive proposal. We take the arguments in this chapter to be in the business of doing that settling.

Briefly, on the idea that our theory is convoluted (this and the next paragraph can be skipped by those uninterested in an exceedingly brief defence of our positive theory in VQ): we assume that degrees of convolutedness are a subjective matter. We find our theory simple; in fact, we always took this to be one of its chief strengths. However, if there’s to be a competition over degrees of convolutedness, we recommend reading Recanati’s paper, trying to make sense of it, and comparing the degrees of convolutedness between the two. We are not convinced he comes out ahead.

About the claim that ‘[t]he form of composition appealed to is, to my knowledge unheard of’, we agree, but don’t see why it should worry him or anyone else. One reason MQ is interesting is that strange things go on there; in particular, MQ is where pure, direct, and indirect overlap. MQ has, in Quine’s apt wording, ‘a certain anomalous’ feature. We took that to be the data, something to be accounted for, and not something to be denied.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{16} In some passages Recanati also claims it is a conventional implicature that when an MQ is used the quoted expression is used demonstratively (Recanati, 2001a, 662f), i.e., an implicature that arises from the
Conclusion

At the end of the day, taxonomy doesn’t matter. It makes no difference what we call ‘semantic’, ‘pragmatic’, ‘non-semantic’, or ‘pre-semantic’. These classifications have a history of generating voluminous debates about nothing but terminology. We hope we have not contributed to any such debate. What does matter is the data and the attempts to explain the data. If there is to be any kind of constructive debate between those of us who endorse very different overarching frameworks for thinking about communication, there has to be some kind of data we can agree upon and that can be described in a more or less theory-neutral vocabulary. The central thesis of this chapter is that there is such data and it is the kind of data that we invoked in our four arguments for a semantic account.

meaning of the expression. He does not think it is a conventional implicature that the quotes in an MQ are used to refer to the quoted expression (see 2001a, 667).

We do not discuss Recanati’s claims about conventional implicatures in this chapter for two reasons: first, we are arguing against what we call ‘non-semantic accounts of MQ’. So, our target is that aspect of Recanati’s view where he does not appeal to conventional implicatures. Since he is adamant that what we treat as semantic belongs to ‘the most pragmatic level of interpretation’, this provides the most useful contrast between our views. Second, we do not think the notion of a conventional implicature is, ultimately, coherent. To present our full line of reasoning here would take us far beyond the scope of the present chapter (and is, for reasons just given, unnecessary to refute Recanati’s view).