

# The Importance of Proving the Null

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Null hypotheses are simple, precise and theoretically important. Conventional statistical analysis cannot support them; Bayesian analysis can. The challenge in a Bayesian analysis is to formulate a suitably vague alternative, because the vaguer the alternative is (the more it spreads out the unit mass of prior probability), the more the null is favored. A general solution is a sensitivity analysis: Compute the odds for or against the null as a function of the limit(s) on the vagueness of the alternative. If the odds on the null approach 1 from above as the hypothesized maximum size of the possible effect approaches 0, then the data favor the null over any vaguer alternative to it. The simple computations and the intuitive graphic representation of the analysis are illustrated by the analysis of diverse examples from the current literature. They pose three common experimental questions: 1) Are two means the same? 2) Is performance at chance? 3) Are factors additive?

NULL HYPOTHESES BAYESIAN HYPOTHESIS TESTING PAVLOVIAN  
CONDITIONING STATISTICAL LEARNING ATTENTION MOTOR  
PLANNING EFFECT SIZE PROBABILISTIC INFERENCE

Experimentalists very often wish to conclude that their data imply a lack of effect under some conditions, or that two different conditions produce the same effect. Almost without exception, they use conventional null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) to buttress these conclusions, a mode of analysis that is antithetical to their purpose. In a recent critique of NHST, Wagenmakers (2007, p. 795) reminds us: “A  $p$  value indicates the evidence against the null hypothesis. It is not possible to observe the data and corroborate the null hypothesis; one can only fail to reject it. Hence, the null hypothesis exists only in a state of suspended disbelief. The APA Task Force on Statistical Inference underscored this point by issuing the warning “Never use the unfortunate expression ‘accept the null hypothesis’” (Wilkinson, 1999, p. 599).”

Experimentalists are generally aware of these officially sanctioned strictures, and yet they persist in doing conventional analyses and reporting “insignificant”  $p$  values in oblique support of conclusions to the effect that performance was at chance in a given condition or that performance in one experimental condition did not differ from performance in a control or comparison condition. They may not use the “unfortunate expression”, but what they intend is precisely that. The challenge that theoreticians and experimentalists alike need to confront is to bring the null hypothesis out of the conceptual closet, where it has been put by an inappropriate statistical methodology. The null hypothesis is often the theoretically most elegant and interesting hypothesis, as witness the invariance laws in physics (see Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2008 in press, for many further examples). It is almost always the more precise

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hypothesis. We should proudly champion it when the data support it.

The following are three illustrations of the importance of proving the null. They are drawn from among a great many examples in the recent literature because of the diversity of the research topics encompassed and because the researchers were willing to share their raw data with me. Their generosity enabled me to apply the to-be-described, computationally straightforward, normative analytic strategy to marshal support for their null hypotheses—in lieu of the non-normative, antithetical, NHSTs that had been published. Together they emphasize the broad importance for psychological theory of empirically supported null hypotheses and the intuitive and graphically obvious way in which Bayesian analysis translates data into odds for or against them.

*Do two means differ?* The first null hypothesis is that 8-fold variation in the number of trials in a learning experience of fixed duration has no effect on the progress of learning (Gottlieb, 2008). It is hard to imagine a more counter-intuitive hypothesis. The assumption that the trial is the basic unit of a learning experience, from which it follows that the progress of learning must depend on the number of such units, is deeply embedded in almost all formalized models of the associative learning process (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner, 1981), as well as in almost all neural net and connectionist models. Thus, the null hypothesis that the progress of learning is *not* a function of the number of trials has far-reaching theoretical significance.

*Is performance at chance?* The second example of a theoretically consequential null hypothesis is that statistical learning does not occur when a stream of items is seen but not attended to (Turk-Browne, Jungé, & Scholl, 2005). If performance on items not attended to is truly at chance, then lack of attention does not simply attenuate the learning of statistical properties, it closes a gate, denying the sequence access to the mechanisms that extract statistical properties. The question whether the learning of the statistical properties of an unattended icon stream is truly at chance speaks to the question whether attention is a matter of selection (gating) or of reducing the allocation of capacity-limited processing resources. This, too, is a null hypothesis whose empirical confirmation has substantial theoretical import.

*Are factors additive?* A third theoretically consequential null hypothesis arises whenever the question of additivity is posed. If factors combine additively, then they are most likely operating independently, that is, the mechanism that determines the contribution of one of the factors gets no effective input from the other ((Roberts & Sternberg, 1993; Sternberg, 1998). Rosenbaum, Halloran and Cohen (2006) investigated the effects of target height and target width on grasp height when subjects reached out to grasp an every day object that was to be moved to a target location. They found additivity, but they remark, “Of course, obtaining evidence for additivity means that we failed to reject the null hypothesis that the contribution of target width would be the same at all target heights. We cannot say, however, that the null hypothesis would definitely fail to be rejected with a much larger group of participants....” – p. 920-921. The hypothesis that there is no interaction is a null hypothesis: it asserts the effects of variation in one factor are the same at all levels of the other factor. Conventional analysis can only argue against this hypothesis, not in favor of it, despite the fact that it is an elegant and simple hypothesis, with strong theoretical implications. No matter how large

one makes the groups, conventional analysis can never provide empirical support for the hypothesis that the factors are additive.

### Essentials of the Bayesian Analysis

A Bayesian analysis considers the null hypothesis and at least one plausible alternative to it in the light of the data. Instead of computing a  $p$  value, as in NHST, it computes the odds favoring one or the other hypothesis. The log base 10 of the odds is called the *weight of the evidence* (Good, 1960).

The two hypotheses make differing predictions about where the data should fall. These differing predictions take the form of *prior probability distributions*. A prior probability distribution specifies our uncertainty about where the data should fall, given an hypothesis—and, often also, some analytic considerations.

The data give us information about the values of  $\theta$ , the natural parameters of the *source distribution*, from which we assume that we have drawn the data. If, for example, we assume that we are drawing from a normal distribution—if that is our *statistical model*—then the data in our sample give us information about its mean and standard deviation. When we assume that the source distribution is normal, then  $\theta = \langle \mu, \sigma \rangle$  are the parameters whose values must be specified in order to define one particular normal distribution. The data and the assumed form of the source distribution (normal, Bernoulli, exponential, etc) together determine the *likelihood function*,  $L(\theta|\mathbf{D})$ <sup>1</sup>. It gives the relative likelihoods of different parameter values (in the current example, different values for the mean and standard deviation) in the light of the data,  $\mathbf{D}$ .

The likelihood function is the source distribution function run backwards. When a distribution function is run forwards, the values of its natural parameters (here,  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$ ) are given and fixed. Graphically, the abscissa represents possible data values. As we vary the value on the abscissa, we read off the corresponding probability or probability density from the ordinate. When we run the distribution function backwards, the data are given and fixed; they are the parameters of the likelihood function. Graphically, the abscissa now represents possible values of a distribution parameter, like the mean or standard deviation. If, for example, it is the mean, then as we move along the abscissa, we vary the assumed value of the mean. At each location, we read off the corresponding likelihood. The likelihood of a location for the source distribution is the joint probability of the data,  $\mathbf{D}$ , when the mean is at that location. Given data, some values for the mean will be more likely than others, and likewise for the standard deviation. The larger the data sample is, that is, the more fixed parameters there are in the likelihood function, the more narrowly the likelihood function constrains likely values for the parameters of the source distribution.

If we assume that there are no prior empirical or analytic considerations that constrain the possible values of a distribution's parameters before we look at the data (if,

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<sup>1</sup> This is often written  $p(\mathbf{D}|\theta)$ . This is confusing because it treats  $\theta$  as given and  $\mathbf{D}$  as variable and because it suggests that the function thus symbolized is a probability distribution, in which case, it should integrate to 1, which it doesn't.

that is, we assume an uninformative prior), then  $L(\theta|\mathbf{D})$  specifies our uncertainty about the values of those parameters after we have looked at the data. However, very often, there are prior considerations that do constrain possible values of the parameters. If, for example, our data are response counts or trials to acquisition, the mean of an assumed-to-be normal source distribution cannot be less than 0. If our data are proportions correct, then  $p$ , the true probability of a correct response, the natural parameter of a Bernoulli distribution, cannot be greater than 1 nor less than 0. If the data come from a 2-alternative forced choice paradigm, then  $p$  cannot be less than .5 (chance). These are purely analytic prior constraints on possible values for the parameters of the source distribution.

Our thinking about *plausible* (as contrasted with analytically possible) values for the parameters of the source distribution is influenced by our hypotheses or beliefs. For example, if we believe that the progress of learning depends on the number of trials a subject has experienced, then we believe that subjects who have experienced many trials have on average progressed further than subjects who have experienced only a few. If we have an empirical estimate of the average progress in a population of subjects experiencing only a few trials, then our hypothesis or belief implies that the average progress in a population experiencing many more trials will be greater. Belief- or hypothesis-based considerations shift the probabilities in one direction or another, making some values more probable and others less, while analytic considerations may make some values for the parameters of the source distribution impossible, forcing their prior probabilities to zero. A belief or hypothesis,  $H$ , together with analytic considerations, determines a *prior probability distribution*,  $\pi(\theta|H)$ . This distribution represents our uncertainty about plausible values for the parameters of a source distribution before we have looked at data drawn from that distribution.

Bayes rule tells us to multiply the likelihood function point-by-point with the *prior distribution* to obtain the *posterior likelihood function*  $L(\theta|\mathbf{D}, H)$ :

$$L(\theta|\mathbf{D}, H) = L(\theta|\mathbf{D})\pi(\theta|H)$$

This function specifies the relative likelihood of different values for  $\theta$  after taking into account both the data, on the one hand, which act through the likelihood function, and, on the other hand, the analytic considerations and an hypothesis or belief, which together act through the prior probability distribution. The graph of  $L(\theta|\mathbf{D}, H)$  versus  $\theta$  looks like a probability distribution, rising above the abscissa and then falling back to it, but it isn't because it does not integrate to 1. Indeed, its integral is usually nowhere near 1.

The marginal or integrated likelihood of an hypothesis,  $L(H|\mathbf{D})$ , is the integral of the posterior likelihood function with respect to the parameter vector:

$$L(H|\mathbf{D}) = \int L(\theta|\mathbf{D})\pi(\theta|H)d\theta.$$

In other words, it is the area under the graph of  $L(\theta|\mathbf{D}, H)$ .

The *Bayes factor* is the ratio of the marginal likelihoods of two contrasted hypotheses,  $H_i$  and  $H_j$ :  $BF_{i\text{vs}j} = L(H_i|\mathbf{D})/L(H_j|\mathbf{D})$ , that is, the ratio of the two areas. It tells us the relative extent to which the contrasted prior probability distributions

correspond to the likelihood function. When the correspondence or lack thereof is graphically visualized, the Bayes factor puts a number on what we see. The graph of the two prior distributions and the likelihood function of the data they predict also shows the relative vagueness of the two hypotheses and the price that the alternative to the null pays for its greater vagueness. We are tempted to be vague to avoid the embarrassment of being wrong, but vague hypotheses can only be vaguely right. Bayesian analysis counteracts the temptation to be vague (cf Myung & Pitt, 1997).

The steps in a one- or two-sample Bayesian analysis for a possible difference in the mean (the Bayesian equivalent of a 2-sample  $t$  test) are:

- Assume a statistical model, that is, specify the form of the distribution from which we have drawn the data.
- Specify the null prior for the expectation of the distribution from which the experimental data were drawn,  $\pi(\mu|H_0)$ . When the question is whether performance is at chance, the null prior is obtained by purely analytic considerations. When there is a control or comparison condition, the null prior is obtained from the analysis of the control data.
- Specify the upper limit on a plausible effect size, thereby limiting the vagueness of the alternative to the null.
- Combine the limit(s) on the possible size of the effect with the uncertainty, if any, about the expectation when there is no effect. The combination of these two uncertainties (these two probability distributions) yields the prior probability distribution that represents the alternative to the null,  $\pi(\mu|H_1)$ .
- Compute the likelihood function given the experimental data.
- Multiply it point-by-point with the two contrasting prior probability distributions to get the two posterior likelihood functions.
- Integrate them to get the two marginal likelihoods. These numbers represent the extent to which the prior probability distributions, one for the null and one for the alternative to it, correspond to the likelihood function.
- The ratio of the marginal likelihoods is the Bayes factor, the odds favoring one hypothesis over the other. Unlike traditional  $p$  values, these odds may favor the null.
- If one is not comfortable with the assumption about the limit(s) on the possible size of the effect, repeat the computation for different limiting values. When the odds favoring the null approach 1 from above as the upper limit on the possible size of the effect approaches 0, the null is unbeatable. When the odds never favor the alternative by more than a small amount for any assumed upper limit on the possible size of an effect, considerations of precision and parsimony favor the null. The null is rejected in favor of a vaguer alternative only when, for some assumption about the upper limit on the possible size of the effect (for some plausible degree of vagueness), the odds substantially favor the alternative.

These steps are illustrated thrice over in the following examples. The most important part of each analysis is the graphic presentation of the competing hypotheses (a null hypothesis and a vaguer alternative to it) together with the likelihood function for the experimental data. These graphs (Figure 5, 7 and 10) make Bayesian analysis conceptually transparent. One can literally *see* why one hypothesis is superior to the other, and what, if any modification might make the alternative a better predictor of the data. For Bayesian analysis to supplant the non-normative method of statistical inference that now prevails researchers must understand it. The graphs are the key to a conceptual understanding of simple Bayesian analysis.


The computational obstacles to simple Bayesian analysis no longer loom. The Bayesian equivalent of the 2-sample, equal variance *t* test, complete with the graphic presentation of the two priors and the likelihood function, has been reduced to a point-and-click operation within Excel™, comparable in its simplicity to the invocation of the ‘TTEST’ function. So has the function for testing observed percent correct against a null of “chance performance.”

### **Example 1: Does Reducing the Number of Trials Really Have No Effect?**

In a simple classical conditioning protocol, the onset of a motivationally neutral stimulus called the CS (e.g., a tone or a light) predicts the occurrence of a motivationally important stimulus called the US (e.g., food or shock) after a fixed delay (the CS-US interval, see Figure 1). That the progress of learning in this paradigm depends on the number of trials (CS-US pairings) has generally been taken to be so obvious as to not require experimental demonstration. Gottlieb (2008) was led to seek experimental confirmation in part by a theory (Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000) that predicted that the number of trials ( $>1$ ) was irrelevant when the duration of training was fixed. More recently, the hypothesis that the number of trials in a training interval of fixed duration should have no effect has been shown to follow from a consideration of the Shannon information that the CS provides about the timing of the next US (Balsam & Gallistel, 2008, in press).

The long established, but little known, quantitative form of the trade-off between the delay of reinforcement (the CS-US interval) and the average interval between trials (the average US-US interval) may also be taken to predict this (Figure 2). To my knowledge, this implication has not previously been pointed out, and it did not motivate Gottlieb’s experiments.

In sum, we have, on the one hand, a strongly intuitive, historical and theoretical presumption in favor of the hypothesis that the number of trials is the primary determinant of the progress of learning. On the other hand, some theoretical considerations and some previous experimental results suggest that reducing the number of trials has no effect on the progress of learning over a given duration of training. There is a lot riding on the outcome of an experiment designed to decide between these contrasted hypotheses, but NHST is in principle incapable of supporting one of them. This highlights the fact that NHST is a non-normative procedure for weighing the extent to which data favor competing scientific hypotheses (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2008 in press).




**Figure 1.** Schematic representation of (a portion of) two different classical conditioning protocols of equal duration but with an 8-fold difference in the number of trials (CS-US pairings) in a given amount of time ( $t$ ). Gottlieb tested the hypothesis that these two protocols have equivalent effects on the progress of learning.

Gottlieb published the results of four experiments testing the null hypothesis that an 8-fold variation in the number of trials had no effect on the progress of learning during a protocol with a given duration. In all of them, he found no significant effect. However, because NHSTs are in principle incapable of supporting the hypothesis that motivated his experiments, the published analyses give no indication of the strength of the support that his data provide for this startling conclusion. Bayesian analysis shows that all of his results (and the results of two experiments he did not publish) strongly support the null hypothesis.


From a methodological perspective, the best experiment was the fourth, in which he measured conditioned responding trial by trial and used a change-point algorithm developed by Gallistel, Balsam, & Fairhurst (2004) to determine for each subject the trial on which it first showed a conditioned response.<sup>2</sup> For one group (Few&Sparse), there were 4 widely spaced trials per session; hence, one trial per quarter session. In a comparison group (the Many&Dense group), there were 8 trials for every one in the Few&Sparse group; hence, 8 trials per quarter session. Because the durations of the sessions were the same, these trials were 8 times more densely packed. For each subject in each group, Gottlieb determined the quarter session,  $Q$ , during which the change point algorithm said that a consistent differential between their responding during the CS and their responding during an equal interval immediately preceding the CS first appeared (hereafter,  $Q$ , or quarter sessions to acquisition). For the Few&Sparse group,  $Q$  is an estimate of the *trial* on which the conditioned response first appeared; for the Many&Dense group, it is an estimate of the 8-trial *block* during which a consistent conditioned response first appeared. The null hypothesis is that the distribution of quarter sessions to acquisition ( $Q$ ) is the same in the two groups.

<sup>2</sup> . The conditioned response in most paradigms appears abruptly (Gallistel, Balsam, & Fairhurst, 2004; Morris & Bouton, 2006). The widespread belief that it grows gradually stronger as training progresses is an artifact of averaging across subjects (Papachristos & Gallistel, 2006)



**Figure 2.** *The number of reinforced trials (CS-US pairings) to acquisition in a standard classical conditioning protocol with pigeon subjects, plotted against the ratio of the US-US and CS-US intervals, on double logarithmic coordinates. (Replotted from Gibbon & Balsam, 1981). US-US is the average interval between USs (aka reinforcements). CS-US is the duration of the warning interval, commonly called the delay of reinforcement. As the  $(US - US)/(CS - US)$  ratio grows, this delay becomes relatively small, making it a relatively better predictor of imminent reinforcement. That is, the CS becomes more informative (Balsam & Gallistel, 2008, in press). The slope of the regression (light solid line) does not differ significantly from -1 (heavy solid line). If it truly is -1 (itself a null hypothesis), then when trials are deleted, the increase in the informativeness of the CS precisely compensates for the decrease in the number of trials, in which case the number of trials is not itself important. What is important is the informativeness of the trials.*

Figure 3 shows the cumulative distributions. They are intimately intertwined, as predicted by the null hypothesis. If the number of trials mattered, the Few&Sparse distribution would lie well to the right of the Many&Dense distribution, because, on average, it would take a subject in the former group more quarter sessions before it began to respond. If the number of trials were all that mattered, the Few&Sparse distribution would be spread out to the right by approximately a factor of 8.



**Figure 3.** Cumulative distributions of quarter sessions to acquisition for two groups in Gottlieb's Experiment 4. These empirical cumulative distributions step up at the locus of each datum. Thus, the number of steps indicates the  $N$  ( $N_{M\&D} = 6$ ;  $N_{F\&S} = 8$ ), and the location along the  $Q$  axis of any one step is the  $Q$  for one subject. The dashed curve is a cumulative Gaussian with a standard deviation of 6.3, which is the pooled maximum unbiased estimate of the standard deviation of the distribution from which the data are drawn (assuming that the source distributions have a common variance, but not necessarily a common mean).

*Assuming a statistical model.* The empirical cumulative distributions in Figures 3 are well fit by cumulative Gaussians, so we assume that for both groups in both experiments the data were drawn from normal distributions<sup>3</sup>. The data do not suggest any

<sup>3</sup> An objection to this statistical model is that it assumes that there can be data with negative values, which is impossible, because  $Q$  cannot be less than 0. One might want to assume a distribution that is only supported on the positive reals. However, the common continuous distributions with this property have 0 probability density for a 0 datum (that is, they are not supported at 0). The data from both groups include a value of 0, so we cannot assume a model that makes such a datum impossible. The common discrete distributions, like the binomial and the Poisson are supported at 0. However, they are one-parameter distributions, with a standard deviation proportional to the square root of the mean. They cannot be made to fit these data, because the standard deviation in these data is much greater than the square root of the mean.


difference in the standard deviations of the distribution(s) from which the data were drawn, and we have no hypotheses about these standard deviations. Therefore, we simplify the computational problem by assuming that both source distribution(s) have the same standard deviation<sup>4</sup>. The pooled estimate of the standard deviation of the source distribution is  $\sigma = 6.3$ . So, we assume that we are drawing from *a* source distribution (the null hypothesis) or *two different* source distributions (the alternative hypothesis) that is/are Gaussian with  $\sigma = 6.3$ .

*Computing the likelihood functions.* The key computation is the computation of the likelihood functions for the two samples. We obtain a likelihood function by sliding the assumed source distribution along the abscissa, as shown in the top two panels of Figure 4. At each successive location, we read off the likelihoods of the data points (see the arrows projecting up and over from 3 of them) and take their product. As we move the distribution around (as we vary its mean), the likelihood of each datum changes (see Figure 4, top two panels). At each location, the product of the likelihoods (one for each datum) is the likelihood of that location. The likelihood function (bottom panel of Figure 4) is the plot of these products as a function of the assumed location. The form of the resulting curve need not be the same as the assumed form of the source distribution, because the parameters of the likelihood function are the data. The parameters of a normal distribution are only two,  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$ , while the parameters of the likelihood function for its mean are the data, of which there may be arbitrarily many.

*The null prior.* The null hypothesis is that the source distributions for the two samples are one and the same (that is,  $\mu_{F\&S} = \mu_{M\&D}$ ). On this hypothesis, when we come to compute the likely location of the source distribution from which the Few&Sparse data were drawn, we have prior information, because we have already made 6 draws from that distribution when we looked at the data from the 6 subjects in the Many&Dense group (the control or comparison group). Before we looked at the control data, we had no information about what the control mean might be (other than that it would have to be positive). Our prior probability distribution on the possible values of the control mean was uniform over the interval in which the control data in fact fall. Under these circumstances (when there is what is called an uninformative prior), then the information we have about the probable location of the mean of this supposedly common source distribution is entirely contained in the probability density function that we get by rescaling the likelihood function for the control data (the function in the bottom panel of Figure 4) to make it integrate to 1. Thus, the rescaled likelihood function for the Many&Dense group is our null prior,  $\pi(\mu_{F\&S} | H_0)$ . It predicts where the mean of the Few&Sparse sample should fall, on the hypothesis that this sample is drawn from the same distribution as the Many&Dense sample.

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<sup>4</sup> This is the assumption we make when we do an equal-variance 2-sample *t* test, which is probably the most common analysis in the experimental literature



**Figure 4.** *Computing a likelihood function. The assumed source distribution (the statistical model) is slid along the abscissa (here the  $\mu_Q$  axis), on which are plotted the known data (solid dots, labeled  $d_1$ - $d_6$  in middle panel, which are the data from the Many&Dense group). The top two panels show it at two locations. At each location, the likelihoods are read off (arrows projecting up from 3 of the 6 data points and over to the corresponding probability densities). The product of the densities is the likelihood of that location (that value of  $\mu$ ), given the data. The likelihood function (bottom panel) is the plot of the likelihood as a function of the possible locations of the source distribution (possible values of  $\mu_Q$ ). Note that the area under the likelihood function is nowhere near one (numbers on ordinate of bottom panel are  $\times 10^9$ ).*

*The First Alternate Prior: Only Trials Matter*

This experiment is unusual in that there is an obvious quantitatively explicit alternative to the null. In models of learning in which the trial is the unit of experience, which is to say almost every model ever formally specified, including almost all connectionist models, the progress of learning depends monotonically on the number of trials. The point at which a conditioned response appears is a milestone in that progress. If only trials matter, it should take subjects in the Few&Sparse group 8 times as many quarter sessions to

reach this milestone, because they experience 8 times fewer trials in each quarter session. The prior probability distribution for this alternative hypothesis is the null prior widened rightward along the  $Q$  axis by a factor of 8 and scaled down by that same factor, to keep its integral, that is, the total probability mass, at 1.

*The Second Alternative Prior (Trials Matter Somewhat).*

A vaguer hypothesis is that there is an effect of the number of trials on the progress of learning, but it is not necessarily as big as would be expected if the number of trials were all that mattered. According to this hypothesis, the mean of the distribution from which the Few&Sparse data were drawn might be as much as 8 times greater than the mean of the distribution from which the Many&Dense data were drawn, but, on the other hand, it might be much less than this. It is hard to say how much less (theory gives very little guidance here), so we might as well allow for the possibility of no effect at all. In doing so, we nest the null, that is, we make it a special case of our alternative hypothesis, the case in which the effect size is 0. The alternative, however, unlike the null, allows for the possibility of a non-zero effect.

*The increment prior.* . In specifying the size (and sign) of the possible effect entertained by a given hypothesis, we specify what I call the increment prior. The question is, how big an effect do we contemplate? We see by looking at the likelihood function for the Many&Dense data at the bottom of Figure 4 that the mean of that source distribution might be as high as 15. Eight times that is 120. Suppose we set the upper limit on the possible effect of deleting 7 out of every 8 trials at an increase of 120 in the mean  $Q$ . We have already decided that we will allow the smallest possible effect under this alternative hypothesis to be zero. If we assume any effect within this range is as likely as any other, then we have an (unnormalized) effect size prior that is uniform between 0 (no effect) and 120 (a huge effect). We note parenthetically that increments can be negative, that is, there can be decremental as well as incremental effects of an experimental manipulation. A “two-tailed” increment prior allows for effects that lie within some specified range on either side of the control mean. In this case, however, no one expects increasing the number of trials to push back the progress of learning.

*Convolving the increment prior with the null prior.* The increment prior does not by itself give us an alternative prior probability distribution for the mean of the distribution from which we drew the experimental data, because the 0-increment must be placed at the mean of the distribution from which the control data were drawn and we do not know where exactly that mean really is. Our uncertainty about its location is specified by the null prior. To get a prior for computing the marginal likelihood of the experimental data under this hypothesis, we convolve the increment prior with the null prior. The convolution operation places the zero of the increment prior at successive locations along the abscissa (here, the  $Q$  axis), scales the increment prior at each location by the probability density of the null prior at that location, then sums point by point all the scaled copies of the increment prior. Intuitively, this operation says, “Well it [the true location of the mean from which the control data were drawn] could be here,” placing the rectangular increment distribution well toward the left end of the x axis, “but that is very improbable, as we see from the null prior. So we won’t give that possibility much weight.” Then, it moves the zero anchor step by small step to the right, leaving behind after each step successive copies of the increment prior, each copy weighted (scaled) by

the corresponding probability density of the null prior. Thus, when the zero is at the peak of the null prior distribution, the convolution says, “Here is a highly probable true anchor point for the increment, so we will give this copy of the increment prior correspondingly greater weight.” When it has finished leaving scaled copies of the increment prior at successive small steps along the  $x$  axis, it goes back and sums point-by-point over all of the copies. The result of convolving the null prior with our increment prior and normalizing to make the resulting distribution integrate to 1 is the dashed flat-topped probability density distribution in Figure 5.

*Computing the marginal likelihoods.* Figure 5 plots the functions that enter into the computation of the marginal likelihoods. Plotted against the left axis (probability density), we have three prior probability distributions, representing three alternative hypotheses: the null hypothesis, the 8x hypothesis, and the somewhere-in-between hypothesis. Plotted against the right axis (likelihood), we have the likelihood function for the experimental data. It represents our uncertainty about where the mean of the distribution from which the Few&Sparse data were drawn lies after we have looked at those data<sup>5</sup>. The question is, which hypothesis—which prior probability distribution—does a better job of predicting the likelihood function? The answer is obvious: the null hypothesis does a much better job; it puts the unit mass of prior probability right under the likelihood function, where the experimental data are. The other two hypotheses spread this same mass of prior probability out to the right away from the likelihood function. They put most of the prior probability where the experimental data aren’t.

As in computing a correlation, one obtains the marginal likelihood of the experimental data under a given hypothesis by taking point-by-point cross products between the prior probability distribution representing that hypothesis and the likelihood function and summing them. Formally,

$$L(H|\mathbf{D}) = \int L(\mu|\mathbf{D})\pi(\mu|H)d\mu,^6$$

where  $L(\mu|\mathbf{D})$  is the likelihood function (the likelihood of various values of the source mean,  $\mu$ , given the data vector,  $\mathbf{D}$ ; see, for example, the heavy curve in Figure 5),  $\pi(\mu|H)$  is the prior probability distribution associated with a given hypothesis,  $H$  (see, for example, one of the dashed curves in Figure 5), and  $L(H|\mathbf{D})$  is the marginal likelihood of the hypothesis. Note that  $L(H|\mathbf{D})$  is simply a number, whereas  $L(\mu|\mathbf{D})$  and  $\pi(\mu|H)$  and their product are all functions (of the variable  $\mu$ ).


The Bayes factors for the different contrasts is the ratio of the marginal likelihoods. Given what we see in Figure 5, it is no surprise that the Bayes factor for the

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<sup>5</sup> Technically, it is the posterior distribution that represents this uncertainty. However, because we are assuming an “improper” prior that is uniform (flat) in the region where the likelihood function is non-zero, the posterior distribution is simply the rescaled likelihood function. The rescaling is of no consequence, because the common scale factor in the numerator and denominator cancels out of the Bayes Factor.

<sup>6</sup> One often sees this written with the  $H$  and  $\mathbf{D}$  and  $\mu$  and  $\mathbf{D}$  interchanged within the argument of  $L(\ )$ . I write it this way to emphasize that in each case the likelihood attaches to the symbol on the left of the “given” symbol, while the symbol on the right is what is given or assumed.

null vs the 8x hypothesis is 216:1 in favor of the null; for the null vs Somewhere-In-Between, it is 32:1 in favor of the null.



**Figure 5.** *The likelihood function for the mean of the 1-trial-per-quarter-session group (heavy curve) and the three prior probability functions corresponding to three different hypotheses: 1) the null hypothesis, which is that the quarter-sessions-to-acquisition data from this group were drawn from the same distribution as the data from the 8-trials/quarter session group; 2) the 8x hypothesis which is that only trials matter, in which case the data from the 1-trial group were drawn from a distribution 8 times wider; 3) the vague hypothesis that the effect of reducing the number of trials per quarter session from 8 to 1 will have an effect somewhere within the range delimited by the null and the 8x hypotheses. The prior probability distributions are plotted against the left axis. They all, of course, integrate to 1. The likelihood function is plotted against the right axis; it does not integrate to 1.*

Bayesians dislike the promulgation of “critical values” (alpha levels), which is such a prominent feature of NHST. Telling the research community what odds are required to decide in favor of an hypothesis is a bit like telling the betting community what odds are required to make a safe bet. The odds are what they are. The data favor the hypothesis that has the larger side of the odds ratio. Those in need of advice on how to use odds to make “safe” bets on scientific hypotheses can consult Kass and Raftery (1995, p. 777). Following Jeffreys (1961), they suggest that odds less than 3:1 are weak, odds between 3 and 10 are “substantial”, odds between 10 and 100 are “strong”, and odds greater than 100 are “decisive.” In terms of the absolute value of the weight of the

evidence, that is,  $\log_{10}(BF)$ , a weight less than .5 is modest to negligible, a weight in the range from .5 to 1 is substantial, a weight greater than 1 is heavy, and a weight greater than 2 is crushing.


*Varying the vagueness.* The most basic difference between Bayesian analysis and a conventional NHST is that the Bayesian analysis brings an alternative hypothesis into the analysis, whereas NHST never considers alternatives to the null. Alternatives to the null are almost always relatively vague (“some effect”). The outcome of a Bayesian analysis depends on how vague. The greater the range of possible effect admitted into the alternative to the null, the more the analysis will favor the null. The question how vague to make the alternative is the essence of what Killeen (2005) has called “the problem of the prior.” There is a general solution: compute the Bayes factor as a function of the vagueness, that is, as a function of the limits on the increment prior. Figure 6 plots the Bayes factor as a function of the upper limit on the increment prior (keeping the lower limit at 0). What it shows is that the null is literally unbeatable. No matter how small one makes the assumed maximum possible effect of deleting 7 out of 8 trials, the odds still favor the hypothesis that the deletion has no effect. Varying the vagueness by varying the width of the increment prior is an instance of the more general practice of testing the sensitivity or robustness of a Bayesian analysis (Berger et al., 1994).

*Autoscaling the vagueness.* Another approach to delimiting the vagueness of an alternative to the null is to let the data tell us the plausible range of possible effects. Approaches to simple Bayesian analysis more formally rigorous than that elaborated here do this by placing a prior on the normalized effect size (see, for example, Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2008 in press). If we assume, for example, that possible effect sizes,  $\delta$ , are themselves normally distributed about 0 with, for example,  $\sigma_{\delta}=1$ , then effect sizes greater than 3 are taken to be a priori very unlikely. A normalized effect size is the possible difference between the source means scaled by the reciprocal of the pooled standard deviation of the samples. In other words, the data determine the scale factor. In the approach here elaborated, a rough and ready autoscaling of the vagueness is achieved simply by letting the width of the uniform increment prior be equal to the span of the data. The rationale is that the true difference between the means of two source distributions is very unlikely to be greater than the span of the pooled data. When we autoscale the vagueness, we ask in essence, Assuming that the difference between the two source means is no greater than the span of our pooled data, which is a better model, one that assumes the two samples come from a single source, or one that assumes they come from sources with different means?

Rough and ready as this approach to autoscaling the vagueness is, it gives reasonable results. For the possible difference between the Many&Dense and Few&Sparse populations, it gives odds of 2.2 in favor of the null. The unit-information prior on normalized effect sizes gives odds of 2.1; the JZS prior (the Cauchy distribution on  $\delta$  and  $p(\sigma^2) = 1/\sigma^2$  on the variance) gives odds of 2.8. (See Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2008 in press, for an explanation of these priors and for a web site that computes the odds.)

Autoscaling the vagueness allows investigators to follow a convention in posing the alternative to the null. It delivers a single number characterizing the strength of the

evidence for or against the null when contrasted with a conventionally vague alternative to it. Thus, it very nearly automates the process of weighing the evidence provided by the data.



**Figure 6.** The odds in favor of the null as a function of the assumed upper limit on the possible size of the effect (double logarithmic coordinates). The dashed line at 1 is where the odds ratio reverses (from favoring the null to favoring the vaguer alternative). Because the plot approaches this reversal point from above as the limit on vagueness goes to 0, the null is unbeatable by any alternative that posits some effect, no matter how small. The thin arrow shows the difference in the sample means that would be just significant at the .05 level. The odds are better than 2:1 against the hypothesis that the effect of deleting 7 out of every 8 trials is so small that it would be at most just detectable by a conventional NHST with samples this size.

*Consistency?* This way of structuring simple Bayesian inference is somewhat unorthodox. The question arises whether it is consistent. Given two samples, A and B, it will often be debatable which should be regarded as the control and which the experimental group. Under many circumstances the hypothesis that the mean of Source Distribution B is greater than the mean of Source Distribution A by some amount and the hypothesis that the mean of Source Distribution A is less than the mean of Source Distribution B by that same amount are interchangeable. When this is true, consistency requires that we get the same Bayes Factor regardless of how we frame the question.

Repeated testing with simulated data (see Supplementary Information) shows that in practice, the computation just described is consistent: it gives the same result regardless of which sample is treated as the control and which the experimental, and it does so even when the sample sizes are grossly different

Consistency is an issue only when analytic considerations do not preclude symmetrical increment priors. The Gottlieb data are an example in which symmetrical increment priors are not possible, because,  $Q$ , the number of quarter sessions to acquisition can be arbitrarily large but it cannot be less than 0. Before we set out to test hypotheses about differences or the lack thereof in the means of Gottlieb's two source distributions, we have already fixed both standard deviations at 6.3. A priori, the mean of whatever we take to be the control group can be any value greater than 0, which means that it could be, for example, .01. If we were to frame the comparison by taking the Few&Sparse group as the control and asking whether the mean of the Many&Dense was less than this, then we would know a priori that, depending on what the mean of the Few&Sparse group turned out to be, our maximum possible effect size might be arbitrarily small. Indeed, in the event, a look back at Figure 3 shows that the maximum possible 0-ward effect size would be only slightly bigger than 1, whereas one theory clearly predicts an effect size much bigger than that. Our measure ( $Q$ ) has an (analytic) floor but no (analytic) ceiling. Therefore, we must frame the comparison so that the direction of the hypothesized difference is upward. Another way of making this same point is to say that both groups have an informative purely analytic prior that gives 0 probability to all values of less than zero.

### **Example 2: Is Performance (with Unattended Triplets) Truly at Chance?**

In the experiments by Turk-Browne, et al (2005), subjects saw a stream of 24 different icons (shapes), some red, some green. The icons of a given color were grouped into triplets, which were always presented in a fixed within-triplet sequence during the familiarization phase. The appearance of the first member of a triplet infallibly predicted that the next icon *of that color* would be the second member of that triplet and that the next after that (of that color) would be the third. Icons from the two different color categories were, however, randomly interleaved, so the next one or two or three icons that appeared in the mixed stream might be from the other color category. To induce the subjects to attend to icons of one color and not the other, the third item of a triplet in the to-be-monitored color was occasionally repeated. Subjects were told to monitor that color stream and to press a key whenever they observed two identical icons of that color occur in sequence. In the familiarization phase, subjects saw streams in which each of the four triplets within each of the two colors was repeated 24 times, with randomization of the triplet orders within each color and random interleaving of the icons from the two color streams. On the 64 trials of a test phase, subjects saw two triplets of icons, all black. One was a triplet that had reappeared 24 times in the familiarization phase, albeit in color (and with other icons of the other color interleaved). The other was a unfamiliar triplet consisting of three different icons they had seen but not in any of the triplet orders they had seen. On half the test trials, the familiar triplet was from the attended color stream, while on the other half, it was from the unattended stream. Subjects were asked to press one of two keys, indicating which of the two triplets seemed more familiar.


In four versions of this experiment, which varied the exposure duration and whether the color at test was or was not the color during familiarization, they consistently found that the mean proportion correct (out of 32) on the attended triplets was significantly above chance, while the mean proportion correct on the unattended triplets was not. Again, intuitively, their data support the null hypothesis that nothing was learned about the sequential dependencies among icons of the unattended color. However, conventional analysis allows us only to say that we cannot reject the hypothesis that performance is at chance for the unattended items. This is an oddly contorted way of describing the data, given that all four mean proportions were at or slightly below chance! Moreover, the theoretical interest is not in whether we can reject the null hypothesis but rather in whether we can accept it. That is the conclusion that Turk-Browne et al understandably argue for, even though their use of conventional statistical analysis did not allow them to marshal statistical support for it. Bayesian analysis supports their conclusion—except for one subject, out of the 34 tested across the four experiments.

The only place in experimental psychology where Bayesian analysis has made inroads is in the fitting of competing regression functions to data (see Lee, 2008, for recent example). In that literature, it is well understood that averaging across subjects before fitting a model often leads to odds favoring models that are not the models that best describe the data from individual subjects, a fact whose importance has been stressed by Estes for more than 50 years (Estes, 1956; Estes & Maddox, 2005). It is seldom noted that the same consideration applies to simple hypothesis testing: If there are theoretically consequential differences between subjects, the group mean is meaningless. (No one has 2.85 cone types.) Therefore, before computing group statistics, I asked whether the data did or did not support the assumption of subject homogeneity. (The details of this analysis may be found in the Supplementary Material.)

In all but the fourth experiment, when subjects were tested with unattended triplets, the odds either strongly favored the hypothesis that subjects had a common underlying  $p$  value or they only weakly favor the heterogeneous  $p$  hypothesis. Moreover, the estimate of the hypothesized common  $p$  was very close to .5 in all three cases (.49, .49, and .50, respectively). This analysis already favors the hypothesis that when subjects have not attended to a stream, they have not detected the sequential dependencies in it. In the fourth experiment, the odds favored the heterogeneous- $p$  hypothesis, but this was largely due to one subject, who got 27/32 correct. One might conjecture that this subject deduced the design of the experiment and estimated dependencies by conscious procedures unconnected with the (unconscious) statistical analysis procedure under investigation. An informal debriefing of this subject tended to confirm this conjecture (Brian Scholl, personal communication, 3/14/08)

By contrast, for the attended color, the odds generally favored the hypothesis that different subjects ended up with different underlying probabilities of correctly detecting a familiar triplet. Simple inspection reveals that some subjects had a very high probability, while others were at chance. The only experiment in which this was not true was the first one, where the exposure duration was short, and all of the subjects had a rather low probability of detecting the familiar triplets. In that experiment, the odds favor the

hypothesis that there was a homogeneous cross-subject  $p$  value for the attended color stream.



**Figure 7.** Left: Likelihood functions (heavy curves, plotted against right axes) and competing prior probability functions (plotted against left axes) for chance (heavy vertical dashed lines at  $p = .5$ ) and for greater than chance (light rectangles with height = 2, with left edge at .5, and right edge at 1). Right: Odds on the null as a function of the upper limit on the possible probability of a correct. A Turke-Brown et al's Experiment 1a, Unattended color. B Turke-Brown et al's Experiment 2a, Unattended color. C. Turke-Brown et al's Experiment 1a, Attended color.

A more sophisticated approach would use a hierarchical model that would compute a representation of the uncertainty about the true value of each subject's

probability parameter and the uncertainty about the distribution of those values in the population of subjects. Methods for doing this are well developed, but the additional complexity would be antithetical to my purpose, which is to show the power and simplicity of elementary Bayesian analysis. Here, these preliminary results were used only to decide when to pool data across subjects and when not to. For the unattended color in Experiments 1a, 1b and 2a, and for the attended color in Experiment 1a, pooling the 8 subjects  $\times$  32 trials gave 256 trials (in each case), and summing the number of correct responses across subjects gave the  $K$ , the number of “successes.” The source distribution is the binomial distribution, with  $N = 256$  and  $K =$  number of successes (total correct responses). The likelihood function is the probability of getting those  $K$  successes in 256 trials as a function of the assumed value of the parameter,  $p$ , which is the underlying probability of a success. The likelihood functions for three of the four data sets are the thick curves in the left hand panels in Figure 7 (plotted against the right axes, as usual).

The marginal likelihood of the data given a prior probability distribution is the sum of the probability mass at different points weighted by the corresponding values of the likelihood function. The null hypothesis (chance responding) puts the entire prior probability mass at .5, so the marginal likelihood of the null is simply the value of the likelihood function at .5. This null prior is merely suggested by the heavy dashed vertical lines at .5 in the panels on the left in Figure 7. These lines are infinite in height (technically, they are Dirac delta functions), but, like all probability distributions, they integrate to 1, that is, the total probability mass is 1, as always.

The alternative hypothesis that the underlying probability of a correct response is greater than chance spreads the unit probability mass evenly over the interval from .5 to 1. The height of the resulting rectangular priors is 2 (because  $.5 \times 2 = 1$ ). In the top two panels on the left of Figure 7, one sees immediately why the chance hypothesis is more likely in the light of these data. The heavy dashed vertical lines at .5 intersect the likelihood functions very near their peaks, so the entire probability mass gets nearly the maximum possible weight from the likelihood functions. By contrast, the rectangular alternative priors spread much of the probability mass well out to the right, where it gets negligible weight from the likelihood function.

Because the peaks of the likelihood functions in the top two left panels are at or to the left of the peak of the null prior, any rightward spread of the probability mass lowers the marginal likelihood. Any hypothesis that spreads any probability mass above chance will be less likely than the null hypothesis, which puts it all at chance. This is confirmed by the panels on the right, which plot the odds favoring the null, as a function of how vague we are about how far above chance the probability of success might possibly be. As one brings the upper limit on the possible probability down to the lower limit at chance, the odds favoring the null approach 1 from above. The graphs for the unattended color in Experiment 1b are identical to those in Figure 7A. Thus, for three of the four experiments, the data from all subjects combined strongly favor the null hypothesis that responding to items with the unattended color was at chance. The odds on the null are 17,17 and 13 to 1. Moreover, in all three cases, the null is unbeatable.

On the other hand, when given the data on number correct from items of the attended color in Experiment 1a, the null cannot compete with *any* vaguer alternative, as


shown by the plots in Figure 7C. The likelihood function for these data has fallen almost to 0 at .5, so it gives very little weight to the probability mass from the null hypothesis. The odds are 8 to 1 against the null, even when the alternative spreads the probability mass over the entire above-chance interval. When the upper limit on the possible is reduced to .6, the odds grow to 28:1 against the null.

Given the other four data sets (the data from the attended color in Experiments 1b, 2a and 2b and from the unattended color in Experiment 2b), we must analyze them subject-by-subject, because the above mentioned preliminary analysis showed that it was unlikely that the subjects had a common probability of success in these conditions. The analysis of a single subject's data is the same as with the pooled data, only it is done with  $N = 32$  (the number of trials for a single subject) and  $K =$  however many correct responses that subject made.

We see in Figure 8 that on the test with unattended triplets, the data from the great majority of subjects favor the null hypothesis, not only in Experiments 1a, 1b and 2a, but also in 2b. How strongly they favor it depends on which hypothesis it is pitted against. When pitted against the hypothesis that  $p$  is anywhere in the above-chance interval (black bars), the odds usually (but not always) favor the null more strongly than when it is pitted against the more precise hypothesis that  $p$  is only slightly greater than .5. However, the odds consistently favor the null even in the latter comparison.

In 34 subjects, there is only one clear exception: For the third subject from the top in Figure 8, both rightward-projecting bars go off scale; the odds against the null for this subject were more than 1,000:1 when it was pitted against the vaguer hypothesis and almost 70:1 when it was pitted against the less vague alternative. The odds are lower in the latter case because the percent correct was substantially greater than allowed by this hypothesis, which puts all the probability mass substantially *below* the proportion of successes observed in this subject. This was the experiment in which we could decisively reject the hypothesis that all the subjects had the same probability of success when tested on unattended triplets. Clearly, the rare subject can either learn sequential dependence in unattended sequences or can respond on the basis of conscious assessments not made by most subjects and not based on unconscious statistical learning. In fact, this subject did substantially better on the unattended triplets than on the attended triplets, suggesting that he/she tried consciously to detect the dependencies in both color streams.

The picture from the tests with attended triplets is mixed. A considerable majority of subjects do learn some or even all of the sequential dependencies in attended triplets. How many they learn, however, varies dramatically from subject to subject; some subjects seem not to learn any (see the leftward projecting bars on the "Attended" side of Figure 8). Because the methods of Turk-Browne are similar to those used by other investigators, one suspects that the same conclusion would emerge if the data from other reports of statistical learning were analyzed on a subject-by-subject basis.



**Figure 8.** Odds for (leftward projecting bars) or against (rightward projecting bars) the null hypothesis (chance), for each of 34 subjects in four experiments with tests of unattended and attended triplets. For each subject and each test, the null is pitted against two different alternatives: i) the probability of correct identification lies anywhere on the interval from .5 to 1 (black bars); ii) it lies between .5 and .65 (that is, it is at most only slightly greater than chance). Asterisks (\*) mark instances in which the odds favor the null when pitted against the vaguer hypothesis but are against the null when it is pitted against the less vague alternative.

**Example 3: Are Factors Additive? (Is there no Interaction?)**

Two factors have an additive effect on some measure if the size of the effect of a given change in one factor is the same regardless of the level (value) of the other factor. Thus, “proving” additivity requires proving a null hypothesis of the form “the magnitudes of these differences are the same.”


The application to this quite fundamental theoretical issue of the already explained methods for supporting null hypotheses through Bayesian analysis is illustrated by the analysis of data from a recent experiment by Rosenbaum, Halloran and Cohen (2006)<sup>7</sup>. They investigated the effects of target height and target diameter on height at which subjects grabbed an everyday implement (a plunger) in order to move it back and forth between a “home” location and a target location. The target location was a ring on a shelf. There was also a ring at the home location. There were two dimensions of variation: the height of the shelf and the diameter of the rings (hence the precision with which the plunger bulb had to be guided into or out of them). The experiment showed that (some) subjects took both factors into account when they grasped the plunger’s handle: the higher the shelf, the lower their grasp, and the smaller the diameter of the target ring, the lower their grasp. A repeated measures ANOVA gave significant main effects for both factors and an insignificant interaction, but this latter is, of course, not what is wanted; what is wanted is a measure of the strength of the evidence *for* additivity.

There were 5 different shelf heights (5 different levels of the Shelf factor) and four variations on the two rings, the ring from which the plunger was removed and the ring into which it was placed. In one condition (the Easy-Easy, henceforth EE) condition, both rings were wide. In the other three (EH, HE and HH), one or both were narrow. Subjects moved the plunger between the home and target locations and then back again twice, giving four grasps within each of the  $5 \times 2 = 10$  combinations of factor levels. The main effect of ring diameter was seen only in the EE condition: When either or both of the rings was narrow, the average subject grasped relatively lower (closer to the plunger’s bulb which had to be removed from one ring and steered into the other), but when both were wide, the average subject grasped higher. The question of additivity bears critically on the model of the complexity of the movement planning process: interactive models are more complex.

Although the published repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant effect of the ring diameter, my preliminary Bayesian subject-by-subject analysis (described in the Supplementary Material) showed that there was an effect in some subjects but not in others. It does not make sense to include in an analysis for additivity subjects whose behavior is unaffected the ring-diameter factor. The question only arises when varying one factor has a clear effect within at least some levels of the other factor. The larger the effect is, the more powerful the analysis for additivity becomes, because there is more room within which to detect differences in the size of the effect at different levels of the other factor. To that end, the data from Subject 7, the subject who showed the biggest effect of the variation in ring diameter, were selected for analysis.

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<sup>7</sup> David Rosenbaum generously supplied the raw data for 10 of the subjects.



**Figure 9.** *The heavy solid curves are copies of a common source distribution. Each copy is centered on the regression line, which, like all regression lines, is constrained to pass through the centroid of the data (at Level 3). The positions of the copies at Levels 1, 2 4 and 5 relative to the underlying data, hence, also the likelihoods, depend on the slope of the regression line. The maximally likely regression lines for the base and EE data are also plotted on the base plane, along with the data (solid line and dashed line). When we vary the slope of the regression line through the base data (curved arrows and dashed-dot lines) and compute the likelihood of the data as a function of that slope, we get the likelihood function for the slope.*

The ANOVA test for additivity does not test for the systematicity of the effects. Any pattern of departures from a constant size of effect as one shifts from level to level of the shelf height factor, if large enough, will yield a significant interaction. Arbitrary, subject-specific patterns of departure are of little scientific interest. What we would like to know is whether in those subjects for which the ring-diameter is taken into account in their movement planning, does the effect of ring diameter tend to converge toward 0 as the shelf gets higher? If so, then the assessment of shelf height enters into the subject's determination of how much of an adjustment to make in response to a smaller ring diameter—an interaction. If not, then the effect of this factor on movement planning is independent of the subject's assessment of shelf height.

The simplest monotonically converging pattern is linear convergence. If we pose as an alternative to the null hypothesis, the hypothesis that the effect of a difference in


ring diameter converges linearly toward 0 as the shelf height increases, then our alternative only has one additional free parameter, namely the slope of the EE data. On the null hypothesis (no convergence), this slope is the same as the slope of the base data (the data from the EH, HE and HH conditions). On the convergence hypothesis, this slope is somewhat greater, so that as shelf height increases, the effect of a difference in ring diameter decreases linearly.

Figure 9 portrays the computation graphically. The means of the three base conditions (EH, HE and HH) are plotted as asterisks on the base plane of the graph. The axes of this base plane are Shelf Height and Mean Grasp Location. The means of the EE condition are plotted on the base plane as open circles. Also plotted on this base plane are the maximally likely regression lines, computed in the usual least-squares way. (The line that minimizes the squared residuals is the maximally likely regression line on the assumption that the residuals are drawn from a normal source distribution with a constant sigma, a sigma that is the same at all locations along the line.) The two slopes are approximately equal, so the evidence for convergence is, at best, not strong. A conventional analysis compares the slope estimates using a  $t$  test. The  $t$  value does not approach significance, from which the conventional analysis concludes that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two slopes are the same. But that is not an assessment of how strong the evidence is that they *are* the same. To get that, we compute the marginal likelihood function for the slope of the EE line using two different prior probability distributions, one based on the null hypothesis, which is that the slope of the EE line is the same as the slope of the base line, the other based on the hypothesis that the slope of the EE line is “somewhat” greater than the slope of the base line. As always, we have to put an upper limit on how much greater we think that slope might be. It does not seem reasonable to suppose that the regression lines would actually cross. If they did, then for some shelf height, the grasp height for a precise placement would actually be higher than the grasp height for an imprecise placement of the plunger bulb. Therefore the slope increment that makes the line through the EE data intersect (converge on) the line through the base data at the highest shelf seems a reasonable upper limit.

The analysis proceeds as usual (details in the Supplementary Material): 1) Compute the likelihood function for the slope of the baseline data and normalize it to get the prior probability distribution for the null hypothesis (parallel regression lines). 2) Convolve this distribution with the increment prior (uniform between 0 and -.15) to get the prior probability distribution for the alternate hypothesis (converging regression lines). 3) Compute the likelihood function for the slope of the EE data. At this point one can make the usual graph (Figure 10), which tells us all we really need to know about which hypothesis the data favor and how strongly. 4) Compute the marginal likelihoods and take their ratio to get the Bayes factor.

The Bayes factor gives odds of 2:1 in favor of the null. These are not strong odds, and we may feel that had we not set the width of the increment prior as wide as we did—had we been less vague about what a “somewhat” greater slope might be—they would be even weaker. Figure 11 plots the Bayes factor as a function of (negative) limit on the increment prior used in obtaining the convergence prior. Figure 11 shows that there is no way to improve on the null hypothesis. Thus, the data favor the additivity hypothesis (no interaction) over the interaction hypothesis, but not strongly. Strengthening the evidence

should focus on identifying those subject that take both factors into account and running more trials with them.



**Figure 10.** *The null prior and convergence prior for the slope of the regression line through Subject 7's EE data (plotted against left axis), together with the likelihood function for the slope of those data (plotted against right axis).*

### Discussion

Proving the null is centrally important to the development of theory in psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience. Claims of no effect or no difference in effect very frequently enter into the argument for the theoretical conclusions drawn from experimental results. Often, the claims of no effect are as important to the argument as are claims that under other conditions (or with other variables), there is an effect. A claim that there was no effect or no difference was the central focus in the examples here discussed. A theoretically important claim of no effect is even more often seen in papers that contrast one experimental manipulation, which is said to have no effect, with another, which is said to have a “significant” effect. Almost always, NHST analyses are used to support both conclusions, but such an analysis is in principle incapable of supporting the first one. Moreover, as has often been pointed out (see Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2008 in press, for examples and citations), the support offered for the second one—in the form of a “significant”  $p$ —may be misleading, because  $p$  values may seriously misrepresent the strength of the evidence against the null. To take an example from Rouder et al (2008 in press, p. ?), it is possible to find an effect on the

mean reaction time that is significant at the  $p = .02$  level when a comparison of the null to a well-motivated alternative gives odds of 3800:1 *in favor* of the null. Because of the theoretical importance of null hypotheses, experimentalists should adopt methods of statistical analysis that measure the strength of the evidence *for* them as well as *against* them. As one bonus for adopting the Bayesian mode, we are forced to consider—and to plausibly limit—the vagueness of the alternatives that we pose, thereby counteracting the temptation to be maximally vague in order to minimize the risk of being wrong. As a second bonus, we get valid measures of the strength of the evidence in favor of these alternatives. The  $p$  values from NHST are not such measures, although they are often treated as if they were.

One conceptual problem and one practical problem have stood in the way of the wider use of the normative (that is, Bayesian) form of statistical inference: The conceptual problem is the problem of the prior on the hypothesis posed as the alternative to the null: How vague should it be? The general solution to the conceptual problem is a sensitivity analysis: compute the odds for and against the null as a function of the limit(s) on the increment prior, that is, as a function of the assumed maximum possible size of an effect (Figures 6, 7 (right panels) and 10). The null is rejected only when this function has a minimum substantially below the odds reversal line (Figure 7C2). As a bonus, the location of such a minimum is an estimate of the effect size. If the function approaches the reversal line from above as the maximum assumed effect size approaches zero, then the null is unbeatable. Because it is more precise and assumes less (equivalently, is a less complex model), it should be accepted. Alternatively, one can use the scale of the data to autoscale the vagueness, either by putting a prior on the normalized effect size (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2008 in press) or by setting the range of the increment prior equal to the span of the data.

Another aspect of the conceptual problem has been a lack of understanding of the basic idea behind Bayesian analysis. Graphic presentation of the competing prior probability density functions together with the likelihood function of the experimental data renders simple Bayesian analysis graphically transparent (Figures 5, 7 (left panels) and 10). Looking at the graphs, one sees that the question is simple, Which prior probability density function better matches the likelihood function? The approximate answer is usually graphically obvious. The Bayes fact puts a number on it.

The practical problem has been the difficulty of the computations. Recently developed software greatly reduces this difficulty. Rouder (2008 in press) gives a web site that computes the one- and two-sample Bayes factors using two different priors on normalized effect sized. The on line Supplementary Material for this paper gives Matlab™ code that reduces the above described computations of the Bayes factors for the for the two-sample (normal source) comparison and the comparison to chance (Bernoulli source) to a call to one of two custom Matlab™ functions. Each function returns the weight and the Bayes Factor and generates the graph of the competing priors together with the likelihood function. The graph makes it visually apparent what the Bayes factor represents, namely, the extent to which the prior distributions posited by the competing hypotheses match the likelihood function of the experimental data. Non-MatLab users may access these computations on line at <http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/~hkourtev/ptn/> or download them in the form of Excel™ plug-ins that run on Windows™ machines.

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