Opinion

Ontogenetic Origins of Human Integer Representations

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Do children learn number words by associating them with perceptual magnitudes? Recent studies argue that approximate numerical magnitudes play a foundational role in the development of integer concepts. Against this, we argue that approximate number representations fail both empirically and in principle to provide the content required of integer concepts. Instead, we suggest that children’s understanding of integer concepts proceeds in two phases. In the first phase, children learn small exact number word meanings by associating words with small sets. In the second phase, children learn the meanings of larger number words by mastering the logic of exact counting algorithms, which implement the successor function and Hume’s principle (that one-to-one correspondence guarantees exact equality). In neither phase do approximate number representations play a foundational role.

A Current Hypothesis Concerning the Ontogenesis of Integer Concepts

In recent years a bold hypothesis has emerged in cognitive science that human mathematical knowledge arises from the ability to encode the approximate cardinality of sets using the analog number system (ANS; see Glossary). The ANS is an evolutionarily ancient system that is observed in non-human animals, human infants, children, and adults [1–8]. Many studies assume [9–11] or explicitly argue [12–18] that the initial meanings of verbal numerals, which in adults express integer concepts, are provided by the creation of item-based associations between number words and ANS values (i.e., representations of particular numerosities).

Compatible with this hypothesis, adults exhibit mappings between verbal numerals and approximate numerical magnitudes [19–26]. These mappings begin to emerge early in development [27–31] and play a role in numerical computations [1]. In addition, there are small but reliable correlations between children’s ability to discriminate sets using the ANS and their arithmetic competence [32,33], and some studies find that training a child’s ANS can improve arithmetic performance ([34,35], but see [36–39] for critiques of these findings). Finally, the neural substrates for the ANS overlap with those deployed in arithmetic and abstract mathematics [40]. These facts establish that the ANS is integrated with symbolic mathematical thought in numerate adults.

However, we address a stronger thesis, which we call the ‘Approximate Origins Hypothesis’, that ANS representations are not only associated with integer concepts but constitute their primary ontogenetic origin, providing a conceptual foundation from which number words are learned. Crucially, the studies described above do not establish when children develop mappings between numerals and the ANS, whether such mappings play a role in learning integer concepts, or even how they could. In fact, there are strong empirical and logical reasons to doubt this hypothesis. Evidence supports an alternative – the ‘Exact Algorithms Hypothesis’ – that posits the gradual integration of exact cardinal meanings with recursive counting procedures.

Highlights

A widely accepted hypothesis has emerged in cognitive science that an analog number system supplies the cognitive foundations of human arithmetic ability.

We provide evidence from experimental psychology, human history, and the philosophy of mathematics that is difficult to explain on this hypothesis.

We describe evidence that acquiring integer concepts depends first on capacity-limit small set representations (for numbers up to ~3–4).

Later learning depends crucially on mastery of exact counting algorithms, and on how these algorithms implement logical notions that are defined over words, individuals, and relations between them, but not over analog number representations.

Learning to represent integers involves learning how the ordinal structure of counting encodes the successor function, and how counting implements a sequential procedure for evaluating one-to-one correspondence and the equality of sets (i.e., Hume’s principle), which allows children to overcome the capacity limits of parallel computations of one-to-one correspondence that restrict small number word meanings.

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Empirical Challenges to the Approximate Origins Hypothesis

Item-based associations between words and the ANS are clearly not the basis for adult integer concepts. First, although adults map the ANS to number words, these mappings are not item-based associations but are instead holistic structure mappings (Box 1), and therefore are not invariant across contexts—a crucial requirement for integer concepts. In tests of random dot-array estimation, adult estimates for large sets are shifted holistically by a single instance of miscalibration [41,42]. In addition, when adults are shown two dot-arrays (2:1 or 3:4 ratio) and must pick which is labeled by a particular number word, they perform at or near chance, compatible with a lack of item-based associations [42]. Similarly, when comparing the magnitudes of Arabic digits and dot-arrays, performance is markedly worse than when directly comparing dot-arrays to one another, suggesting that the content of numerals is not defined by associations with magnitudes [43]. Finally, although the intraparietal sulcus represents both symbolic (words, digits) and non-symbolic (visual sets) number in the brain, directly correlating patterns of activation for particular quantities across these two formats finds no evidence of shared representations [44]. In sum, there are no stable item-based associations between number words and ANS values that could supply integer concepts.

Evidence against the Approximate Origins Hypothesis also comes from studies of how children acquire number words. Shortly after age 2 years, middle-class children in the USA learn to recite a verbal count list to around ‘ten’ [45,46], but lack meanings for these words [47,48]. They begin by learning a meaning for ‘one’, then months later ‘two’, then ‘three’ and sometimes ‘four’ in sequence [30,46–52]. This protracted period, evaluated using the give-a-number task, is called the subset-knower stage. Sometime later, at the age of 3½–4 years, children learn to accurately count and generate sets for any number within their count list, at which point they are classified as cardinal principle (CP)-knowers.

These stages provide several challenges to the Approximate Origins Hypothesis. First is why children only learn meanings for ‘one’ through ‘four’ before they become CP-knowers. Some have argued that this set-size limit may reflect the poor ANS acuity of preschoolers, and that mappings for larger numbers exist but are simply not exact [12]. Against this, there is abundant evidence that most children lack mappings between verbal numerals and ANS values above 3–4 until after they become CP-knowers. When asked to estimate sets from 1 to 10, ‘three’- and ‘four’-knowers, as well as many CP-knowers, provide accurate responses for 1–4. But subset knowers, as well as roughly half of young CP-knowers, provide random estimates for larger numbers [27,30]. Some studies claim that subset-knowers do map larger numerals to the ANS [17,27,53]. However, as we review elsewhere [54], these findings either conflict with other similar datasets, fail to classify children’s knower levels, or make analytic decisions that frame children’s response errors as being compatible with ANS signatures, when in fact the tasks used are incapable of measuring such signatures. A reanalysis of past studies finds little evidence for mappings above ‘three’ or ‘four’ [54], and computational models of children’s behavior confirm that capacity-limited stages, rather than the ANS, provide the best account of existing data [51,55,56]. Given that non-human animals can learn to condition responses on specific ANS values [1–3], there is no reason in principle why children aged 2–3 years could not learn to associate ‘seven’ with ANS values of approximately 7, given sufficient evidence. However, existing evidence suggests that the ANS does not provide the numerical content of even small numerals ([57]; Box 2).

Eventually children do acquire mappings between larger numerals and the ANS [27–30]. Children aged 5–7 years show evidence of item-based associations between numerals and the ANS, but
only up to about 6; mappings for children’s larger numerals are not item-based but, as in adults, are based on a holistic and malleable structure mapping [28].

**Clues from the Cultural History of Counting**

The Approximate Origins Hypothesis also confronts a broader puzzle that is presented by human cultural history. If number word meanings merely reflect the content of the ANS, why would our human ancestors have bothered to create counting systems in the first place, rather than simply associating verbal labels with ANS values? The historical record suggests that humans constructed counting systems rooted in systems of one-to-one correspondence to overcome the noisy limits of perception, and in support of equitable trade [58–73].

Although many languages that lack counting systems have labels for numbers up to 3–4 ([62,71, 74,75]; Box 3), no language features a system of large approximate cardinal meanings. Many languages have singular morphology, others have dual morphology for sets of 2, and some even have trial markers for sets of 3 ([62]; Box 3). However, no language exhibits morphology for cardinal values of 5 or more, whether exact or approximate [62,74,75]. When humans first created symbols for larger sets, they did not begin by associating words with ANS magnitudes, working from these associations to derive rules of arithmetic. Instead, they began with labels for small sets, and expanded these representations with exact algorithmic systems – for example, tally systems that place objects into one-to-one correspondence with arbitrary external symbols, beads, stones, or body parts [59,61,74–82]. For example, many tally systems begin with fingers and toes to tally the first 10–20 items, and then extend onto other body parts to tally larger sets. Although tally systems can represent numerical magnitudes, ANS representations are not implicated at any step in a tally. Instead, the fixed order of tallies in a body count guarantees that any two counts ending at a particular location (e.g., elbow) will generate equal sets. This, in turn, creates the conditions for words such as ‘hand’ and ‘foot’ to be used as shorthand descriptions for the outcomes of counts – in other words, to represent cardinal values. For example, in some dialects of Hup, an Amazonian language, the word for 5 translates as ‘one-hand’, 10 as ‘hands-be-finish’, and 20 as ‘feet-be-finish’ [78]. Similar systems have been documented in multiple languages throughout the Amazon region, as well as in other regions of the world.

In sum, over cultural evolution, as in ontogenesis, exact symbolic number representations begin with verbal representations of small sets that are independent of counting. A separate system, beginning with one-to-one tallies, extends exact representations to larger numbers. In this respect, the historical facts paint a portrait analogous to the facts from child development. However, as we describe below, the problem faced by children differs from that of our ancestors in one crucial respect. The cultural construction of large exact numbers emerged from tally systems instead of tally systems that explicitly used one-to-one correspondence to establish the cardinal equivalence of sets. By contrast, children are provided a count list that is initially learned as a meaningless routine and must gradually learn how this list implements number.

**Approximate Number Could Never Build Exact Number**

Despite the evidence reviewed thus far, is it possible that future studies might show that the ANS does, after all, supply the building blocks from which number word meanings are built? We believe the answer to this is a definite ‘no’. First, there is currently no well-articulated causal theory regarding how the ANS might play such a role. Second, we believe that no such theory is forthcoming because the ANS lacks the content that number words express.

Formally, integers can be defined in at least two provably equivalent ways commonly discussed in the philosophy of mathematics ([83–85]; Box 4), although other formulations exist [86–88]. One
approach begins with Hume’s principle that one-to-one correspondence guarantees numerical equivalence. Counting leads to representations of numbers that respect Hume’s principle because items in a counted set are tagged in one-to-one correspondence with numerals that are uttered in a fixed order: Any two counts that respect one-to-one correspondence and end in the same numeral will therefore generate sets that are equal. The task of children is to learn how blind one-to-one procedures guarantee equality, and how this is related to the cardinal meanings of number words. A second way to define the integers is via the Peano axioms, which include the successor function as a primitive (i.e., every number, \( N \), has a successor, \( N+1 \)). Counting mirrors the successor function in its syntax because it provides morphological rules for generating the next numeral in a verbal count sequence when one individual is added to an already enumerated set [89]. As we review below, children also learn how the syntax of counting relates to cardinal increments of +1, and thus how counting implements the successor function.

Crucially, both Hume’s principle and the successor function implicate representations well beyond what the ANS provides to learners [90–92]. First, the ANS lacks a mechanism like one-

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**Box 1. Associative Mapping and Structure Mapping**

Multiple studies have found evidence for two distinct forms of mapping between verbal numerals and ANS values. One mechanism involves the formation of item-based associations between individual number words and corresponding ANS values, such that the mappings for each number word are distinct. A second mechanism involves the formation of a single analogical mapping between the structure of the verbal count list as a whole and a range of corresponding ANS values, such that the mappings for different numbers words are causally interdependent.

Previous studies have found that, in adults, associative mappings extend up to the number 10 or 12, whereas in children aged 5–7 years they extend up to the number 5 or 6, such that estimation of larger numbers is supported by structure mapping. In support of this divide, when participants are shown two dot-arrays (e.g., 10 and 20) and asked to match a single label to one of the two (e.g., ‘ten’), both children and adults succeed for small numbers, but respond at or near chance for large numbers despite being equally good at discriminating these comparisons perceptually (Figure I). In addition, when asked to make verbal estimates of dot-arrays up to, for example, 350, participants who are told that the largest array they will see is, for example, 750 shift their estimates for all dot-arrays except those in the small number range, which are resilient to miscalibration.

These studies provide evidence for robust item-based associative mappings between small number words and ANS values, but structure mappings for numbers beyond 10. These findings are important because they suggest that children and adults lack stable, item-based associations between individual number words and ANS values, such that if the ANS supplied the meanings of number words then their meanings would be malleable and context-dependent, and therefore would be unable to support reliable, exact, mathematical computation.

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**Figure I. Discrimination and Number Matching.** (A) Stimuli for dot-array discrimination and number-matching tasks. (B) Performance of 5-year-old children on discrimination and number-matching tasks.
to-one correspondence that can establish the exact equality of sets. The ANS is a type of analog magnitude system (AMS), not a system for representing relations between individuals or sets. Thus, it cannot represent one-to-one correspondence as a matter of principle because one-to-one correspondence is a function defined over individuals, not magnitudes. Similarly, the ANS provides no way to represent the successor function. Like real or rational numbers, the ANS lacks the notion of ‘next number’ which is required for establishing a successor function. Although one-to-one correspondence and the successor function can each be used to describe large numerical magnitudes, the ANS cannot explain the origin of these principles. Based on similar observations, some have argued that the ANS should not be called a number system at all, and that the word ‘number’ should be reserved for symbolic numeral systems ([72], see also [93–98]),
Although we resist this stronger position here, given that analog representations can have numerical content, we share the conclusion of these studies that, despite being able to represent the magnitude of sets, the ANS cannot represent number in the way that the integers do.

Recognizing these problems, some proponents of the Approximate Origins Hypothesis have sought to supplement the ANS with additional machinery, for example by also positing innate principles that are coextensive with the Peano axioms or Hume’s principle [99,100]. However, once this innate knowledge is added, the ANS is no longer necessary to explain the origin of integer concepts because the proposed innate principles already supply all of the needed content. Moreover, these accounts still fail to explain the protracted course of number word learning, as well as the specific attested stages of learning. Although it remains possible that children are endowed with innate logical knowledge of integer concepts, we currently lack evidence for this, and also lack a theory for how children identify these representations as being relevant to number words from a larger space of possible linguistic meanings. What is clear is that adding rich innate representations cannot rescue the Approximate Origins Hypothesis, but only replaces the role of the ANS in explaining the origin of integer concepts.

Any future version of the Approximate Origins Hypothesis must confront this challenge: it should not only show how number words become associated with the ANS (or how a logic can redescribe magnitudes) but also how the ANS might provide the conceptual basis for acquiring the logic of counting and large exact number words. Short of stipulating that the ANS has such content – that fundamentally it is not a magnitude system, but a logical system – it is difficult to see how such a proposal might work.

The Exact Algorithms Hypothesis

If the Approximate Origins Hypothesis fails to explain the origin of integer concepts, how else might they arise? Under our proposal – the Exact Algorithms Hypothesis – there are two distinct phases of development that are analogous to two aspects of the historical record. First, children
acquire small exact number word meanings by associating words with small sets and, second, they discover the logic of counting through the repeated use of its algorithms to model set representations. Neither phase implicates representations of approximate numerical magnitudes.

Small Number Words
Under the Exact Algorithms Hypothesis, the meanings of small number words such as ‘one’, ‘two’, and ‘three’ are acquired from representations of small sets. Before children learn to count, they begin acquiring linguistic representations of sets, including quantifiers such as ‘some’ and ‘all’, as well as singular, dual, and plural morphology [101–105]. Notably, learning these verbal set representations is correlated with learning small number words. First, children who are faster to acquire the meanings of words such as ‘some’ and ‘all’ are also faster to learn their first number words [105]. Second, children learning languages with singular/plural marking are faster to begin learning number words relative to children learning languages without singular/plural agreement [106–108]. Third, children learning languages with a singular/dual distinction are faster to learn the meanings of the words ‘one’ and ‘two’ than are children who speak a dialect of the same language that lacks a singular/dual distinction [103,104]. These data
suggest that set representations are available to children early in acquisition, and that morphology and number words may draw on similar representational resources. However, they raise two important questions: (i) why are children’s first exact number representations limited to 3 or 4, and (ii) what form do the non-verbal representations encoded by these words take?

Studies of preverbal infants suggest one explanation for the set limits found in early number language. Infants, like adults, can attend to multiple objects in parallel and encode them in working memory [parallel individuation (PI)] [92,109–112]. For example, if infants see from one to three objects hidden in a box and are allowed to search and retrieve them, they continue to search until all objects are recovered. Surprisingly, performance collapses if more than three objects are hidden, suggesting that PI represents each individual using a distinct mental symbol in working memory, and that the number of symbols that can be tokened in parallel is limited to ~3, resulting in the set-size limit found in infants.

Importantly, PI representations cannot alone supply the meanings of number words. PI provides working memory models of individual items attended to in the here and now, but not long-term summary representations of sets and their properties that could serve as cardinal meanings. Even so, we see two ways that it might play a role. On one hypothesis [30], PI provides a representational medium for small number word meanings, and is enriched by long-term memory to represent cardinality. For example, a long-term memory model of a particular set {finger, finger} might be associated with the word ‘two’, such that any currently attended set that can be placed in one-to-one correspondence with this model, can be labeled ‘two’. Alternatively, instead of providing the medium of representation, PI might provide a capacity-limited one-to-one system for evaluating hypotheses, which are articulated in another format, such as the set representations of natural language that support singular/dual/plural, quantifiers, etc. [92]. On either account, small number word meanings are grounded in set representations that support computations like one-to-one correspondence. However, these representations are still not enough to explain the origin of integer concepts. For this, a system of exact counting algorithms is required.

**Counting, the Successor Function, and Hume’s Principle**

Although representations of small sets play an important role in the acquisition of small number words, they cannot alone explain the origin of integer concepts. First, like the ANS, they cannot express a recursive rule like the successor function. Second, they cannot be used to assess equality for numbers greater than 3–4 because they compute one-to-one correspondence in a parallel, capacity-limited way. Counting, by contrast, provides an external (verbal) medium with a structure that mirrors successor relations between integers, and establishes a one-to-one correspondence between labels and objects sequentially, which guarantees that any two counts that end at the numeral will have the same exact cardinal value. Crucially, this exact algorithm does not impose a set-limit on one-to-one correspondence because every step is computationally equivalent independent of magnitude: each requires knowing where one is in a count (e.g., the last word counted was ‘twenty-five’), what comes next (‘twenty-six’), and that as each number word is uttered, an additional item should be counted. Thus, counting allows children to redeploy an existing understanding of one-to-one correspondence in a sequential procedure that provides exact meanings for an unbounded number of numbers. The challenge is to explain how children make this developmental transition.

If the logic of number words arose from associating the count list to ANS values and noticing properties of this mapping, we might expect children to begin learning this logic early in development because even 2-year-old children have robust ANS representations and have begun to
count. However, there is substantial evidence that learning this logic hinges on becoming a CP-knower, years later, and thus on the mastery of counting algorithms. First, although children begin to count by age 2 years, they only begin to learn how counting represents the successor function after they become CP-knowers. Subset-knowers are unable to infer that adding 1 to a set of 4 results in ‘five’, let alone that all numbers have a successor, or that numbers are infinite, and half of young CP-knowers also fail this task [113–116]. When trained on the successor function, CP-knowers improve, whereas subset-knowers matched at pretest on knowledge of the successor function do not, suggesting that becoming a CP-knower is a gateway to acquiring this knowledge [85]. Most likely this is because learning a verbal encoding of the successor function builds directly upon counting abilities found only in CP-knowers, not just on associations between words and magnitudes. Only by around age 5½ years – 1 or 2 years after they become CP-knowers – do children exhibit evidence of having learned a fully recursive successor function that generates an infinite set of numbers, a feat which may be related to learning the grammatical rules that generate numbers in the count list itself [92,115–118,123].

Similarly, there is evidence that children’s appreciation of Hume’s principle is related to their mastery of counting algorithms. Although children deploy various one-to-one procedures early in childhood (e.g., counting while pointing to objects, patty-cake, eeny-meeny-miney-mo), they lack insight that these procedures establish numerical equality. The knowledge that one-to-one guarantees equality (i.e., Hume’s principle) is not connected to children’s use of number words until after they become CP-knowers [119–122]. Compatible with this, Frydman and Bryant [119] asked children to share 15 candies equally between three recipients, and, after allowing them to count one of these three sets, asked them how many the other recipients received, a form of transitive inference called cardinal extension [122]. They found that children who were old enough to be CP-knowers (i.e., 4-year-old children) failed, whereas most 5-year-old children succeeded, indicating that children likely learned the link between one-to-one correspondence, equality, and number words after the CP transition. More recent studies [120–122] confirm this. For example, Sarnecka and Wright [121] presented subset-knowers and CP-knowers with sets aligned in one-to-one correspondence, told them the cardinal label of one set, and then asked them how many were in the second set. Only CP-knowers performed better than chance, suggesting that this is a crucial prerequisite for learning how one-to-one correspondence relates to the cardinal meanings of number words.

Integrating the Exact Algorithms and the ANS

We began by noting that exact symbolic representations of number are ultimately integrated with the ANS, and that this integration is important to using numbers in mathematical reasoning. Historically, it is likely that humans invented exact counting algorithms precisely because they observed, via their senses, that sets differed in numerical magnitudes, but realized that these percepts were too noisy to be reliable tools of equitable trade and record keeping [123]. Although integer concepts are not built from the ANS – and could not be – the integration of these systems is both natural and beneficial to human numerical reasoning and social interaction.

The history of mathematics provides multiple examples of how representing reality in multiple ways enhances understanding. For example, Descartes’ integration of graphical and algebraic representations of mathematical functions demonstrated that although either of these formats of representation can represent functions, each makes different aspects of the same reality more or less salient and available to different types of computations. Mapping exact symbolic systems to magnitudes adds intuitive content and allows explicit symbols to inherit the computational affordances of the magnitude system (e.g., numerical comparison and approximate arithmetic). Symbolic systems are sometimes difficult to use when they are not mapped to magnitudes,
explaining why it takes time to transition from Celsius to Fahrenheit, to recognize good versus bad deals in a foreign currency, or to reason in a novel counting system such as binary notation [124, 125]. Although approximate magnitudes do not explain where exact symbols come from, they are often the things that we describe when we use numerals, and they play a central role in giving numerals their intuitive connection to the world.

Concluding Remarks

Adults associate number words with the ANS via a holistic structure mapping which lacks stable, item-based, cardinal meanings. Neither small number words nor counting, however, implicate the ANS. Developmental and anthropological data suggest that humans are predisposed to learn linguistic forms describing small sets, and that larger cardinal meanings depend on constructing a system of exact counting algorithms. Current work suggests that learning integer concepts depends on learning counting procedures, and integrating them with computations like one-to-one correspondence and the successor function. Counting procedures are crucial because repeated acts of counting create a workspace in which children can learn relations between numbers, objects, and sets.

Many outstanding questions remain. First, given that children begin counting many months earlier, it remains uncertain why they must become CP-knowers before they learn that counting offers a sequential procedure for assessing one-to-one correspondence and equality, and is governed by a successor function. Is becoming a CP-knower purely a matter of learning a blind counting procedure, or does it mark a moment of conceptual insight? Second, when do children integrate the ANS with counting – and can such mappings be trained before mastery of counting? Could learning mappings play a role in later stages of counting mastery – for example to learn that numbers later in the count list denote greater quantities? Finally, how can the complex developmental facts described here be captured by formal computational models, to afford precise formulation and assessment of hypotheses? (see Outstanding Questions). Previous models [126] demonstrate that integers can be built from primitives including set representations, a count list, a quantification logic, and input that pairs number words with cardinal values. However, as argued elsewhere, much work remains to align such models with existing developmental evidence [127]. A future priority is the development of models tested against rich developmental data which confront how logical representations are implemented in the mind and deployed in learning.

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Outstanding Questions

Is becoming a CP-knower purely a matter of learning yet another blind-counting procedure, or does it mark a moment of conceptual insight in which children understand something new about how numbers represent cardinality? If so, what?

How does counting come to respect Hume’s principle in development, and is this related to mastery of how counting encodes the successor function? Or are these causally distinct in development?

Many studies find no mappings to the ANS before the CP-knower stage, and failures to train mappings even in CP-knowers. When is the ANS integrated with counting, and are there conditions under which such mappings can reliably be trained before mastery of counting? At what point in the mastery of cardinal meanings, and of counting, do children first show evidence of holistic structure mappings?

In what ways can computational modeling and cognitive neuroscience illuminate our studies of how children come to represent integers?
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