

## Error theory and truth conditions of moral judgments

Suppose that our ordinary moral judgments "present themselves as being objectively and universally true" (quoting Stich's comments on Haidt and Relativism). Suppose also that this "presupposition about objectivity and universality [is] built into moral intuitions and judgments." Suppose also that the presupposition is false. Would this imply "that all moral claims are false"?

Stich notes an analogy between moral intuitions and grammatical intuitions. "The person who takes his moral intuitions to be universal and objective is like the person who takes his grammatical intuitions to be universal and objective – and who thus views people who speak different dialects or languages as mistaken about something."

Would all of this person's grammatical claims be false because of this? No. Except where he is specifically making claims about the other people who speak different dialects or languages, the best way to assign truth conditions would seem to be in relation to that person's language. If the person's grammatical claims are true of his dialect (or idiolect) then they should be counted true.

Similarly, according to one form of moral relativism, even if a certain speaker's ordinary moral judgments falsely present themselves as objectively and universally true, etc., the best account of truth conditions of most of these judgments counts them true if they are true in relation to the speaker's moral framework.

"But the claim the speaker takes himself to be making, the claim the speaker intends to be making, is false." That appears to be compatible with counting the claim the speaker actually makes as true.