What Did You Call Me? Slurs as Prohibited Words

Setting Things Up

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It is no secret that slurs offend. Yet public figures regularly manage to embarrass themselves or worse because of their unreflective uses of these explosive words. Not long ago radio personality Dr. Laura Schlesinger got into trouble by repeatedly uttering ‘nigger,’ much to the dismay of a shocked African American caller. Even though it was clear Dr. Schlesinger did not intend to insult anyone, her callous use caused such a stir it ultimately led to her resignation from the show.

The bottom line is slurs are messy, and so, require great care in their analysis; in particular, two important features of slurs must be explained: first, why do slurs vary in offense both across groups (‘chink’ is more offensive that ‘cracker,’ ‘gimp’ more than ‘suit,’ and ‘bitch’ more than ‘pig’) and even for co-referring slurs (‘nigger’ is worse than either ‘coon’ or ‘darkie’). Second, how can slurs admit of non-offensive uses within certain specially marked didactic contexts, and perhaps with quotation, but more commonly with so-called appropriated (or reclaimed) uses among in-group members?

Recent literature in the philosophy of language and linguistics divides the explanatory landscape into two broad camps: content-based and non-content-based, with the consensus being that (uses of) slurs express negative attitudes towards their targets. Content-based theorists adopt different strategies for implementing this view, but all agree that slurs (or their uses) communicate offensive content.

In this essay, we will challenge the consensus and defend a non-content based view. According to us, slurs are prohibited not on account of offensive content they manage to get across, but rather because of relevant edicts surrounding their prohibition. We will argue that Prohibitionism, a term we coined, accounts for all the relevant data, viz., both variation in degrees of offense among slurs and their non-offensive uses, better than the content-based competitors. We will proceed as follows: First, we will present our positive view and address specific issues that arise for it. Next, we will defend our view from objections, possible and actual. And finally, we will compare Prohibitionism with certain alternatives,
and show why we believe it to be superior. Before we dive in, several clarifications are in order.

2. Terms of Enragement

Slurs are distinct from their neutral counterparts, i.e. co-referential expressions for the same group without any derogation, but what distinguishes them? In an earlier paper (see Anderson and Lepore, forthcoming), we wrote:

What’s clear is that no matter what its history, no matter what it means or communicates, no matter who introduces it, regardless of its past associations, once relevant individuals declare a word a slur, it becomes one.

Note that we are not insisting a declaration is necessary for slurring, but only sufficient for a word to become a slur. Also, we are not claiming anyone can create a slur.

A relevant individual must declare a word a slur for it to become one; but who are these individuals, and how do they acquire their authority? Typically, they will be members of the targeted group. But even a recognized spokesperson for a targeted group may lack the authority to establish that a word is a slur, especially should enough fellow members refuse to respect the edict. This is what happened when the Reverend Jesse Jackson tried at the 1988 Democratic National Convention to convert 'black' from a neutral counterpart into a slur. His attempt failed, because not enough targeted members went along with him.¹

Determining the basis for a group’s right to decide its own referential status is complex. An ability to do so may seem to fit in with the right to self-determination. It is widely noted that, for instance, groups have a right for their culture to be respected, and perhaps, supported.² Names are often important aspects of a group’s culture, and so, it is reasonable to include the manner in which a group is referenced as a part of its right to self-determination generally.

¹ In addition to members of the targeted group, caretakers of members who cannot object themselves can declare an expression a slur. This is obviously what happened with the slur 'retarded'.

² http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-group/
If this is correct, it is a short step from a right to determine whether the use of a name is permissible to one to determine whether its use is impermissible. If groups have power over naming legitimacy through a right of self-determination, then to address them by a non-approved name might easily result in insult. What is not clear is how approved and non-approved names are determined. Within a particular group there may be differences of opinion as to which names are acceptable and which aren’t. And since usually no actual congress settles these issues, acceptability, then, must be determined organically. The names that happen to “take” among a significant portion of the relevant linguistic community are the ones deemed acceptable.

A further important distinction between *slur words* and *acts of slurring* should also guide our investigation into how to identify slurs. Slurring as a speech act can be performed with expressions that are not themselves slurs. (2) can be used to slur Mexicans even though ‘those people’ is not itself a slur (imagine heavy emphasis on *those people*).

(1) A: Carrie’s Mexican gardener asked her on a date.

(2) B: I hope she said no. She can’t possibly find *those people* attractive.

Tone or emphasis on locution could render clear that the speaker intends her use of the phrase as an insult. The speaker intended to “disparage, deprecate, calumniate, asperse,” as the *Oxford English Dictionary* describes it. However, B’s slurring use of ‘those people’ does not establish that the expression is a slur anymore than *verbing* a noun makes it a verb.

What, then, exactly is a slur? A GSA (Gay-Straight Alliance) network anti-slur campaign defines it as: “any offensive, insulting remark or comment that is meant to ridicule someone based on their race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, religion, class,

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3 By ‘name’ here we mean nothing more than a referential kind term. Whether slurs are natural kind terms, non-natural kind terms, or something else is an issue left for another day.

4 Hom and May (in this volume) draw a similar distinction between slurs as parts of token speech acts, and pejoratives as linguistic expressions employed in those speech acts.

5 Note that carrying out this act could be achieved with a wide range of expressions. Indeed, B could have used the neutral counterpart ‘Mexican’ to achieve the same result. These uses appear to be specially marked, perhaps through stress.

6 It is doubtful complex demonstratives like ‘those people’ could become slurs, but we could imagine certain innocent noun phrases evolving into slurs over time through repeated slurring uses.
This definition is a commonsense description captures popular attitudes, but is inadequate since it fails to distinguish slurs from slurring. Besides, not all slurs are offensive. It is doubtful whether ‘cracker’ and ‘suit’ still generally evoke much offense.

Another worry about the GSA definition is breadth. In filling out the linguistic category for slurs, we do not want to include every single insulting remark or comment. That would be too expansive, and ultimately, unhelpful since many offensive remarks are contextually determined. It is, after all, possible to use virtually any locution to derogate; what makes many comments derogatory has more to do with conditions under which they are uttered rather than anything about the locutions themselves. A more nuanced proposal, and indeed, the received view, is that slurs are better categorized on the basis of their literal content. A word is a slur only if “predicating it of a subject is a conventional means of denigrating its subject.”

This definition presumes there is a particular negative content communicated through the use of a slur as a matter of meaning alone. But, of course, is not necessarily so.

Look up any slur in the dictionary, and you will find pretty much the same entry, i.e. ‘is a derogatory term for group y.’ This sort of listing seems to reveal more about function rather than about what’s communicated. Of course, there are those who would suggest a slur’s function is a part of its meaning; that is, that slurs are performatives whose utterances constitute a pernicious action.

Austin (1965) describes performatives as utterances that do something rather than describe, state or report something. Under this construal, slurs are performatives that derogate their target. And performativity, it is suggested, is a semantic feature indicating a derogation can be performed in uttering it. But, unfortunately, the view that performativity is part of linguistic meaning faces a couple of objections.

First, it entails that performative verbs are systematically ambiguous. “For a performative sentence can be used literally but non-performatively, e.g. to report some habitual act.”

For example, one might describe typical situations in which one gives a

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8 Thanks to Wayne Davis for this suggestion.
9 Kent Bach, http://online.sfsu.edu/~kbach/perform.html
10 Bach, ibid.
command by saying “I order so-and-so to be done,” without actually giving an order. Such a literal but non-performative use would, on this view, count as a distinct sense, which is highly implausible. And second, even if a performative verb was never used performatively, wouldn’t it retain its meaning? Perhaps, performative acts would be conducted without the use of performative forms. This would show performativity is not a matter of meaning.

These objections, originally applied by Bach to performatives generally, straightforwardly extend to slurs. Consider a situation in which someone drives by a group standing on a corner and yells out:

(3) You niggers and spics don’t belong here!

Imagine that everyone in this group is African American, and that one of them attempts to clear up the confusion with (4),

(4) I think you three must be the niggers, and thee rest of us are the spics.

In (4), we have a non-performative use of the slurs, and so, if performativity were a part of lexical meaning, and slurs were ambiguous between these two senses, then the occurrence of ‘niggers’ and ‘spics’ in (3) would carry a different sense than those in (4), which is absurd.

Ultimately, slurs as a linguistic category may be best defined in terms of content, but we should not confuse their definition as a class with what renders them offensive. To clarify this distinction, we turn directly to Prohibitionism.

3. Prohibitionism

Prohibitionism is simple and straightforward: slurs are prohibited words, and so, a violation of their prohibition might provoke offense. Further, their prohibition is ubiquitous; for example, embedding a slur inside a sentence does not immunize its users from transgression, even though sentential embedding can render semantic (as well as pragmatic) properties inert. This is because the prohibition, once put in place, is on every occurrence of the slur; and occurrences cannot be eradicated. This explains why the vilest slurs refuse to submit to a unilateral detachment of “the affect, hatred and negative connotations tied to most slurs,” and it is also explains why we cannot “use them interchangeably with their neutral counterparts” (Richard 2008, 62). Any attempt at
conversion or a swap for a neutral counterpart ignores the prohibition. Therefore, only efforts that find a way to relax the prohibition can hope to neutralize a slur.

Even placing a slur within quotation marks, or in a semantic attribution, need not shield us from its offense, as in (5) and (6),

(5) ‘kike’ means kike.
(6) ‘kike’ is a derogatory word.

Speakers are often reluctant to evaluate sentences like (5) or (6) because doing so risks complicity. We have a responsibility to see to it that certain violations of the prohibition are prevented or, in the event that a violation does occur, to report it, or at least voice opposition to it.

Danger surprisingly lurks in indirectly reporting another’s use of a slur. Usually, a speaker can indirectly report on another’s utterance without incurring responsibility for its effects. Al’s indirect report (7b) of Mika’s utterance of (7a) unproblematically attributes the content of its complement clause to Mika, not to Al, no matter how offensive Mika’s original utterance was.

(7a) Joe is rude.
(7b) Mika said that Joe is rude.

But should the complement clause of an indirect report contain a slur, as in (8), then whatever offensive content that slur carries will be attributable to the reporter:

(8) Mika said that Joe is a wop.

This is a mysterious result for a content-based approach to slurs to explain, but for Prohibitionism the reason for the result is obvious. Whoever indirectly reports Mika with (8) is charged with an offense because in making this report the reporter violates the prohibition on the slur it contains.

With these clarifications in place, we turn to a number of challenges that have been raised against Prohibitionism.

4. Objections to Prohibitionism

One frequent objection concerns the order of explanation: critics charge that Prohibitionism gets it backwards; it is the offense that explains the prohibition, not the other way ‘round. The problem with this criticism is that it overlooks other paradigm cases of offense resulting from violating a prohibition. In Jewish history, pronouncing the
tetragrammaton (i.e. YHWH) was (and still is) prohibited.\textsuperscript{11} Uses of the name are offensive (perhaps, even blasphemous) because they violate this prohibition. But the name isn’t prohibited because its content is offensive. Is there any reason to believe that this sort of explanation is limited to divine names? Obviously, prohibitions are not set in place without reason, but that reason needn’t be that slurs express offensive content. (They are names after all!)

One plausible story might be that groups prohibit names not explicitly adopted by them, for calling a group by a name that its members have not chosen may be viewed as an attempt to usurp their authority to choose.\textsuperscript{12} Another reason for prohibition, one expressed in a letter written to W.E.B. DuBois, is that it matters who introduced the term.\textsuperscript{13} In situations where one group is in a subordinate position to another, uses of an expression by the dominant group to refer to the subordinate one can provoke offense. The dominant group’s use of the expression might be a vivid reminder of the relation of oppression in which the subordinate group is situated.

Another objection to Prohibitionism is that it does not distinguish between the offensive characters of slurs and profanities or other “bad” words. Prohibition is what most likely explains the offense attached to profanities. But since a slur’s offense is generally perceived to differ from that of a profanity, prohibition cannot be the whole story about slurs.

What exactly is this difference supposed to come to? Is it a difference in reaction among hearers? It is not clear there is one. Is the point that any witness to the use of a slur would object more than one to the use of a profanity? But this difference can’t be guaranteed. Someone with Victorian sensibilities would be just as put off by a profanity as by a slur. Perhaps, the relevant difference is in the effects on targeted members; we are more offended at being the target of a slur than being the target of a profanity (see Jeshion this volume). This may be so, but even if it is, Prohibitionism surely has resources to explain why. We generally place slurs higher on the prohibition scale than other

\textsuperscript{11} Jacobs (1999).
\textsuperscript{12} Thanks to Vincent Colapietro for this point.
\textsuperscript{13} Du Bois (1928).
profanities, thus showing we will be more offended by violations of the former than of the latter.

Another objection to Prohibitionism questions whether it can accommodate the offense created by the mere existence of certain thoughts. The objection is that we are offended not only by spoken and written slurs but also by others harboring certain thoughts even if they keep them to themselves. The objection continues, since it is unlikely thoughts are prohibited, how can Prohibitionism explain this sort of offense?

It’s not obvious Prohibitionism is obliged to account for whatever offense is created by the existence of certain thoughts. Is the charge that these thoughts are offensive because they include slurs in the thinker’s mental language? This assumption is obviously not innocent. Are speakers of a language that lacks slurs for certain targeted groups incapable of having such thoughts? Suppose their language includes various slurs for the same group. Which thoughts correspond to which public uses? Or is the charge that such thoughts are offensive because they contain a particular content?

To the extent that we can even make sense of the first suggestion, Prohibitionism provides a straightforward explanation of the offense. Since the thought is alleged to contain (whatever that might mean) a prohibited term, this alone explains its offense. The criticism (if coherent) simply moves the discussion from the level of public discourse to the level of inner discourse. The second suggestion, namely, appealing to negative content, returns us to the objections we raised against content-based approaches for slurring terms in general. If those objections are sound, it is difficult to see how moving the discussion to the level of thought will make things any better.

Other objections against Prohibitionism arise in the form of different views about the nature of slurs. We will address some of these views, such as Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Externalism, in the following three sections.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^\text{5. Expressivism}\)

One reaction to Prohibitionism is that it ignores the negative attitudes slurs are purported to express. Slurs are “a conventional means to express strong negative attitudes

\(^\text{14}\) For criticisms of other content-based accounts, e.g. Presupposition, Tone, and Conventional Implicature theories, see Anderson and Lepore (forthcoming).
towards members of a group,” according to Richard (2008). Just what would Prohibitionism be missing, according to Richard? He provides a clear example of someone who holds that the proper place to locate a slur’s offense is in the attitudes it expresses:

To think or talk slurringly of a person is, among other things, to have certain attitudes towards him, including evaluating him negatively and having contempt for him because one takes him to be of a certain race, ethnicity, religion, etc. The difference between thinking that Prince Charles is English and thinking that he is a Limey is, in part, that one is contemptuous of him when one thinks him a Limey, and thus thinks of him negatively when one thinks him a Limey. The attitude—the contempt—is part of what one thinks (14).

According to Richard, the attitude of contempt works its way into the meaning of slurs, into what is said. Commenting on why the use of a slur is rejected, Richard writes, “it is our rejection of the thought that He is an S [S being a slur]—what the sentence says, in as strict a sense of ‘says’ as you like—that is responsible for our reaction” (40). And, according to Richard, part of the thought of a slur contains an attitude of contempt.

In (Anderson and Lepore, forthcoming), we deny that slurs differ in literal content from their neutral counterparts. We write that a slur’s “linguistic role is exhausted in picking out the same group as a neutral counterpart” (17). Thus, our position is at odds with what Richard claims. An obvious question for him is what does it mean for a contemptuous attitude to be part of what is said by an utterance of a sentence with a slurring sentence?15

It is clear Richard does not understand the attitude to be a part of truth-conditional content. Rather, he argues its inclusion in a slur’s content renders any statement in which the slur occurs as non-truth apt. He resists calling such statements true because that would be to endorse the thoughts they express (24); and, of course, non-bigots will want to resist this. But, saying such statements are false is to charge the bigot with merely making a corrigible mistake; this too is unacceptable since the kind of representation involved with

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15 One view we do not discuss for the sake of brevity is Williams’ (1985) notion of ‘thick concepts.’ Like Richard, Williams characterizes slurs as terms that combine classification and attitude. But unlike Richard, Williams regards utterances of sentences with slurs as possibly true, but objectionably couched. However, if we are required to see the attitude as in some way a part of ‘what is said,’ then William’s account will be subject to the same objections raised against Richard.
slurs is one where “truth and falsity are simply the wrong terms in which to evaluate the representation” (25).

To be left with an attitude that each slur linguistically expresses as part of some broader conception of meaning, while still being a part of what is said, is all very well and fine to claim, but what does it mean? There are precedents, for example, in Karttunen and Peters’ (1978) claim that conventional implicatures are a non-truth-functional aspect of linguistic meaning, but it is questionable whether invoking this category will help Richard’s case.

Grice introduced the notion of a conventional implicature, by which he meant an inference that is fixed by the meaning of an expression, but which does not contribute to the truth conditions of the sentence in which it occurs, that is, it does not contribute to what speakers say with utterances of that sentence. Grice observed that (9a) implicates (9b):

\[(9a) \text{John is British but brave.}\]
\[(9b) \text{John’s being British contrasts with his being brave.}\]

But notice that, although (9a) implies his being British contrasts with his being brave, it does not say it. So, in effect, to use (9a) while disbelieving (9b) would be misleading, but it would not be a lie. Could the use of a slur, then, create a conventional implicature that there is something inferior about the group to which the slur applies?

One immediate problem with this suggestion is that many philosophers of language insist conventional implicatures are never part of what is said. And secondly, even if the claim is only that the contemptible attitude is encoded in linguistic meaning in manner similar to a conventional implicature, we have already raised objections to this account (see Anderson and Lepore, forthcoming). It behooves Richard to provide more detail about what he has in mind by non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning that are still a part of what is said.

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16 Richard’s notion of representation is not clear. The claim that one can (mis)represent in a way that precludes evaluation for truth or falsity sounds odd and wildly implausible. Perhaps, Richard has something like pictorial representation in mind. When evaluating, e.g. a map, we do not typically use truth or falsity to judge it, but rather appeal to accuracy, e.g. “The map is an accurate representation of downtown New Brunswick.” Understanding representation in this way may make his claim sound more plausible.
Also, Richard owes us an explanation of what is going on with slurring sentences that appear to be *bona fide* assertions. When a bigot utters a sentence like ‘Jerry Seinfeld is a kike’ or ‘African Americans are niggers,’ he certainly *seems* to be making a statement that is either true or false. Richard denies these statements are truth apt, but not because they are expressives or performatives. He says, “If I say, referring to Smith, ‘That asshole is at the door’, I display contempt for Smith by calling him an asshole. *That* does not prevent what I say from being true” (34). ‘Asshole’ is obviously a pejorative used to display contempt. In that way it shares a function with slurs. The difference, according to Richard, is that slurs are “intrinsically misrepresenting,” while pejoratives like ‘asshole’ are not. He says, “the way assholes behave merits contempt” (34). In response, note that putting things this way already presupposes a certain kind of content for terms like ‘asshole,’ i.e. truth-evaluable content. What entitles Richard to this assumption? Isn’t this exactly what he is supposed to be establishing?

A further worry about Richard’s view (and Expressivism, in general) is, as noted earlier, that slurs vary in offense. Prohibitionism has a straightforward way of accounting for this variation. How can Expressivism account for it? It is implausible to suggest that attitudes of different intensity are associated with different slurs. There is no good reason to think users of ‘gook’ have a more intense attitude of contempt for their target than users of ‘cracker’ do for theirs. Expressivists, then, are left without a viable explanation of a crucial feature of slurs.

Finally, Expressivism does not obviously carry the resources to explicate appropriation. Richard acknowledges that a slur’s target can use the term in a non-derogatory way but argues “there is a case to be made that in appropriation there was a meaning change” (16). This response is inadequate since it fails to explain why, for at least some terms (e.g. ‘nigger,’ ‘fag,’ ‘bitch’), the appropriated sense is not typically available to out-group members.

One can imagine Richard responding to this charge by saying that he is not on the hook for explaining why out-group members typically cannot access the appropriated sense. He only needs to show that the in-group uses the slur with a different sense than the derogatory version. He might say, “Sure. The out-group member cannot use the expression. But the reason she cannot is not linguistic; perhaps, it’s moral or social. Some
non-linguistic norm may bar her from using the slur with its appropriated sense.” And this non-linguistic norm does not show the slur cannot be ambiguous between a derogatory and a non-derogatory sense.

While this strategy may provide hope for other views—depending, that is, on the explanation of the non-linguistic norm—it does little for Richard – for according to him, the slur would have to be ambiguous between two different attitudes. Appropriated uses of the slur express a non-derogatory attitude and slurring uses a derogatory one, but why, then, would it be inappropriate for out-group members to use the appropriated term? How could there be a rule that forbade people to think a certain way? Assuming the attitude is one of solidarity (as is often supposed with appropriated uses), how could there be a rule that forbids that? Thus, expressivism comes up short.

6. Inferentialism

Inferentialism says we should understand slurs in terms of the types of inferences they license. Brandom (1994), Dummett (1973), Tirrell (1999), and Whiting (2008) have offered views that appeal to the slur’s inferential role to determine its semantics. According to Tirrell, “The meaning of a word or expression is a matter of its various actual and possible sentential roles” (46). Whiting concurs, adding, “that an expression is or would be employed in specific inferences is determinative of its meaning” (375). These “use theories” of meaning claim that the meaning of words is determined by how they are employed in linguistic communities.

Applied to slurs, then, their meaning would be unpacked in terms of inferences they license. A classic version of Inferentialism is in Dummett, who characterizes the conditions for the slur ‘boche’ as:17

The condition for applying the term to someone is that he is of German nationality; the consequences of its application are that he is barbarous and more prone to cruelty than other Europeans. We should envisage the connections in both directions as sufficiently tight as to be involved in the very meaning of the word: neither could be severed without altering its meaning.

17 Dummett (1973), 454.
Dummett goes on to say that anyone who “rejects the word does so because he does not want to permit a transition from the grounds for applying the term to the consequences of doing so” (454). A disposition to draw certain inferences—in this instance, the inference that Germans are more prone to cruelty than other Europeans—adequately captures the meaning of a slur, and these inferences explain a non-bigot’s objection to the use of slurs.

This version of Inferentialism is subject to devastating objections. First, if to understand a term, to grasp a concept is to be disposed to draw certain inferences, then, since non-bigots are not disposed to draw these inferences, they cannot understand these terms. But, as Williamson (2003) notes, “We find racist and xenophobic abuse offensive because we understand it, not because we fail to do so” (257).

A second objection, also from Williamson, challenges Inferentialism in general. Despite the claim that meaning of an expression is determined by its inferential role, the non-bigot understands a slur prior to any awareness of the inferences it supposedly licenses. Isn’t there an antecedent meaning we use to evaluate the propriety of an expression’s role in inferential transactions? Thus, in contrast to Dummett, the non-bigot knows the meaning of ‘boche’ without being disposed to draw certain inferences. This is bad news for Inferentialism.

For Inferentialism about slurs to be viable, it has to be that bigots and non-bigots can both grasp the meanings of the same expressions while differing in dispositions and attitudes. Whiting (2008) purports to establish just this by first rejecting the idea that slurs and their neutral counterparts differ in semantic content:

Careful examination of a racist’s use of the term ‘Boche’ might reveal it to mean the same thing as we mean by ‘German.’ Thus, the meaning of ‘Boche’ is given by whatever inferential rules govern (and thereby determine the meaning of) ‘German’ (385).

On Whiting’s version of Inferentialism, a slur and its neutral counterpart share semantic content. The inferences speakers are disposed to draw from uses of ‘German’ are exactly the ones they are disposed to draw with uses of ‘boche.’ Instead of locating the offense of a slur in semantic content, Whiting proposes we place it in the pragmatics of its uses. He says, “Inferentialism deals with that aspect of a word that is shared by its neutral counterpart (e.g. ‘German’) and an additional Gricean apparatus is wheeled in to explain
the respect in which it causes offense” (385). The offense of slurs has to do with “offensive associations” rather than with semantics.

One might be skeptical about this “defense” of Inferentialism. An account of conventional implicature consistent with Inferentialism is needed; Whiting does not provide one. Besides this worry, we have raised objections to a conventional implicature account (see Anderson and Lepore, forthcoming) that if correct undermine Whiting’s appeal. We noted that Bach (1999) and others have cast doubt on the existence of conventional implicatures. Bach maintains that (10), but not (11), is a correct report of (9a),

\begin{align*}
(9a) & \quad \text{John is British but brave.} \\
(10) & \quad \text{Frank said that John is British but brave.} \\
(11) & \quad \text{Frank said that John is British and brave.}
\end{align*}

But if ‘and’ cannot be used to correctly report Frank’s utterance of (9a), then, contrary to Grice, the contrast expressed by ‘but’ is not merely implied, but part of what is said.

Another objection not only of Whiting’s Inferentialism, but of all other versions as well is based on the fact that slurs admit of non-derogatory uses. In order for Inferentialism to extend to appropriated uses of slurs, it must be shown how standard inferential transactions licensed by the term get nullified when used by particular users. This would presumably mean assigning a different set of inferential licenses based on the identity of the language user; one set for out-group members, a different one for in-group members. This is further complicated by the fact that in-group members are capable of slurring other in-group members. So, in addition to identifying these sets, an Inferentialist must tell a story about how in-group members relate to both sets, as well as how the occasional out-group member obtains access to the set of appropriation inferences. This is a tall order.

7. Externalism and Others

Finally, there is a constellation of views that attempt to locate the offense of slurs in literal content. Hom (2008) adopts, roughly, the view that the linguistic meaning of an

\footnote{He does hint at a possible account in fn. 21.}
expression is partially determined by factors external to the speaker. A slur’s derogatory content is semantically determined by social institutions (430), which Hom models with two components: an *ideology* and a *set of practices*.

An ideology is a set of (usually) negative beliefs about a particular group of people. For racism towards Chinese people, the ideology might include beliefs such as: that Chinese people have slanted eyes, that Chinese people are devious, that Chinese people are good at laundering, and so on. In general, the set of racist practices can range from impolite social treatment to genocide. 19

On Hom’s account — *Combinatorial Externalism* (CE) — a slur’s meaning is distinct from its neutral counterpart’s. A slur’s negative content is determined by social institutions. CE maintains Prohibitionism fails to account for all of a slur’s content since it denies slurs necessarily differ in content from their neutral counterparts.

CE faces numerous problems (some raised in this volume both by Jeshion and Camp). We mention only one further objection. 20 As we noted earlier, co-referring slurs can and do vary in offensive force. Hom tries to account for this variation by appealing to the pervasiveness of the racist institution that backs the slur. However, this strategy cannot work. To account for variation, Hom would have to propose distinct institutions for each slur, which is implausible. It is difficult to see how else Hom’s externalist view could account for this important datum.

Another semantic challenger is Camp. According to her, there is a close relationship between a slurring expression and a *perspective*, i.e. "an integrated, intuitive way of

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20 We briefly mention another worry. In Hom and May (this volume) they give the following semantics:

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\forall (X,Y) = T \text{ iff } X \cap Y = X \\
\exists (X,Y) = T \text{ iff } X \cap Y \neq \emptyset \\
\neg \exists (X,Y) = T \text{ iff } X \cap Y = \emptyset
\]

Notice that the clause for the universal yields the following result, ‘All chinks are spics,’ given that the intersection of chink and spic are trivially identical to chink (since Hom and May claim slurs’ extensions are null). This is an unwelcome result.
thinking about members of the targeted group” (this volume, 6). She regards this relationship as *semantic*, offering the contrast between the following sentences as evidence,

(12) They gave the job I applied for to a spic.
(13) They gave job I applied for to a Hispanic.

Camp claims (13) could give rise to certain negative implications that can be canceled if the speaker doesn't mean to signal any bad or negative feelings towards Hispanics. On the contrary, she claims, the same is not possible with (12). A speaker, in using a slur, signals “his allegiance to a certain perspective...in an overt and non-defeasible way, precisely in virtue of employing that expression” (11). The stubbornness of the purported perspective in (12) is supposed to signal the presence of a *semantic* rather than a *pragmatic* feature. The charge from Camp, then, will be that Prohibitionism does not account for this crucial perspectival component she has identified.

Jeshion (this volume) raises a number of objections to Camp’s view as well; we will mention two of our own. First, it seems Camp’s view is subject to the same objection we raised against Hom, namely, it fails to explain variation in offense among co-referring slurs. If Camp is correct, the use of any slur for a group should signal the same allegiance to a particular perspective, and thus, evoke the same offensive force. But this is not so. And second, it appears Camp’s view is subject to objections she herself raises against the claim that slurs conventionally express contempt. She rejects this view because (a) a speaker can consistently deny feeling contempt or negative feelings towards the target, and (b) some people who use slurs don’t take them to express contempt, but rather they are just the correct terms for picking out members of the targeted group. But, then, why couldn’t the same be said of her perspectives? A speaker could conceivably deny allegiance to a negative perspective in her use of a slur. And certainly we can conceive of users of slurs who believe they are the appropriate terms to use and who do not think they signal any allegiance to a negative perspective.21 If these objections stand up, then Prohibitionism has not missed anything in not assigning a role to semantic content in its explanation of a slur’s offense.

21 For example, this individual might be someone who thinks objecting to being called by a name is a display of oversensitivity and “PC nonsense.”
8. Conclusion

Throughout this essay we have maintained that *Prohibitionism* better explains the offenses created by the uses of slurs than its competitors do. We have done this by extolling the virtues of Prohibitionism—i.e. its ability to explain the difference in offense among slurs, both among various groups and co-referentially, as well as a plausible explanation of appropriation—and by highlighting the shortcomings of its competitors. We addressed persistent issues raised by its opponents, for example, why Prohibitionism does not get the order of explanation wrong. We argued there are situations where the prohibition is the *genesis* of the offense rather than its result. A remaining issue that we have no definitively addressed here concerns the definition of a slur. We believe the worries flagged for various attempts at defining the category show that the task will not be easy. Appealing solely to function or content risks enlarging the category beyond recognition.
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