The Particular Elements of Perceptual Experience (talk recording available)
Dr. Susanna Schellenberg
Tuesday, March 11, 2014, 01:00pm - 02:00pm
Rutgers University, Department of Philosophy
When we perceive an object in our environment, we are perceptually related to a particular in our environment. What kind of mental state are we in, when we are perceptually related to a particular? Is the mental state individuated by the particular? For instance, if we want to think of the mental state as having content, should we think of this content as a singular proposition? When we suffer a non-veridical hallucination as of an object, then it seems to us that there is a particular object present, where in fact there is no such object. If perception is individuated by particulars, what is the nature of a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination? This paper discusses different ways one might adjudicate these questions and explores metaphysical, epistemic, psychologistic, and semantic approaches to accounting for the particularity of perceptual experience.
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