Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. In this paper, I present a dilemma for theorizing about the connection between phenomenality and cognitive access. Either there is a conceptual connection between phenomenality and cognitive access that, pace Block, implies a necessary connection, or there is no conceptual connection but then the empirical evidence will - for principled reasons - underdetermine the theory describing the exact nature of the connection.
Event Details
Psychology, Neuroscience, and the Consciousness Dilemma
- Event Date: November 17, 2011
- Event Start Time: 12:00 PM
- Event End Time: 7:00 PM
- Event Location: Rutgers University, Department of Philosophy, Newark
- Event Semester: Fall 2011
- Event Contact: Dr. Katalin Balog
- Event Extra info: <a href="http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~kbalog/">Dr. Katalin Balog</a>