Abstract: The question of which mental functions require consciousness has recently come to the forefront because of its relevance for investigating animal consciousness. Finding out that an animal can perform a function associated with consciousness would count as evidence that it has conscious states. I argue that most of the empirical research interpreted as showing that some functions are associated with consciousness fails to show this. Instead, it merely shows that the relevant functions falter when based on degraded sensory signalswhich is unsurprising. This issue hinders empirical research on the functions associated with consciousness. I explain how consciousness research can do better when investigating the functions that require consciousness. Until the relevant research is properly carried out, the presence of functions supposedly associated with consciousness in non-human animals should not convince the skeptics one bit
Bio: Dr. Matthias Michel
Matthias Michel is an assistant professor at the department of Linguistics & Philosophy at MIT. He specializes in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science, with a focus on the scientific study of consciousness. Most of his work is about the methodological foundations of consciousness research, unconscious mental processes and what can be done unconsciously, and consciousness in non-human animals.