The so-called 'computational theory of mind' claims that mental processes are computational processes. After explaining how this claim should be understood, I consider the popular view that it is just a metaphor to speak of the mind as a computer. I argue that this view is mistaken: computationalism, if true, implies that the human mind is a computer in the same sense that iPads and hand calculators are computers. I then consider how computational explanations of cognitive capacities are constrained by our commonsense conception of ourselves, and how computationalism puts pressure on the very idea of mind.
Event Details
Understanding Computational Models of Mind
- Event Date: October 22, 2015
- Event Start Time: 1:00 PM
- Event End Time: 2:00 PM
- Event Location: Rutgers University, Department of Philosophy
- Event Semester: Fall 2015
- Event Contact: Dr. Frances Egan
- Event Extra info: <a href="http://frances-egan.org/">Dr. Frances Egan</a>