Paradoxes of individual coherence (e.g., the preface paradox) and group coherence (e.g., the doctrinal paradox) typically presuppose that deductive consistency is a coherence requirement for both individual and group judgment. In this paper, we introduce a new coherence requirement for (individual) full belief, and we explain how this new approach to individual coherence leads to an amelioration of the traditional paradoxes. In particular, we explain why our new coherence requirement gets around the standard doctrinal paradox. However, we also prove a new impossibility result, which reveals that (more complex) varieties of the doctrinal paradox can arise even for our new notion of coherence. This is joint work with Rachael Briggs, Fabrizio Cariani, and Kenny Easwaran.
There is also a (draft) manuscript that goes with this talk, which is available at: http://fitelson.org/icagc.pdf
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