Event Details

The talk will refer to three papers, each representative of a large body of historical and ongoing work in experimental economics.  

(1)   Individual decision making (Birchby, et al), where fundamental uncertainty looms large).

(2)   Small group strategic interaction (Schotter and Sopher) where distributional concerns loom large.

(3)   Large group coordination games (Chaudhuri, et al) where beliefs about beliefs loom large.

Each of these situations presents us with an unsolved problem for economists, solutions to which I believe cognitive scientists may be able contribute, both from a modeling and from an empirical perspective. In the talk I will characterize what I take to be the unsolved problem in each of these three areas, illustrating with specific details from the papers, and speculating on alternative approaches to these problems, based in cognitive science.

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The talk will be based on papers, you can download from here with an eye to opportunities that might exist for a cognitive science approach to address the same questions.